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Top-down coercive type of liberal peacebuilding has characterized the 
interventions by international community in many post-conflict societies after the 
Second World War. Recent studies suggest that in order to build a more lasting peace 
a bottom-up, non-coercive approach is needed to balance the former and deal with the 
immediate needs of local communities. In approaching the question of how peace and 
reconstruction efforts can be made more sustainable, this thesis evaluates whether 
strategic arts-based programs with local content have the potential to build stronger 
communities by establishing peaceful resorts to settle daily disputes by participants. It 
further examines three such programs implemented by Search for Common Ground in 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen and Nepal. By evaluating the available 
quantitative and qualitative data, this thesis shows that some arts-based programs are 
more effective in establishing peaceful ways of conflict resolution than others. 
Specifically, there is evidence that communities in Democratic Republic of Congo 
have learned and incorporated the new methods of conflict resolution in their daily 
lives presented to them during the participatory theater performances. However, the 
program in Yemen which used episodic drama, showed no effect on changing 
behaviours on a national level and had a limited impact on a local level. Similarly, the 
program in Nepal proved to be quite effective in transforming the attitudes of the 
people directly involved in the creation of the peace songs but showed no effects on 
the general public exposed to the songs via radio or TV. I conclude that there is 
reason to be hopeful that strategic arts programs can be useful in peacebuilding, 
although more research needs to be done to find out how best to tailor such programs 
to each specific situation and to develop a more comprehensive framework to guide 
policymakers and peacebuilders around the world.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Research Design and Literature 
 The level and magnitude of violence that is currently shaking all the corners of 
the world might come as a surprise to some who believed that the worst is behind and 
that the efforts made by the world leaders after the Second World War to unite and 
prevent future conflicts would lead to a change for the better. An entire body of 
literature related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding has been developed and 
various programs have been implemented all over the world to address these issues. 
Unfortunately, many of these attempts to bring peace ended with limited 
achievements and the cycle of violence is being perpetuated.  
For the past sixty years the UN peacekeeping missions have been instrumental 
in helping countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace. 
However, the presence of troops is not always sufficient. They maintain the status quo 
without addressing the root causes of conflicts at hand and each election period can 
sparkle a new crisis and destabilize the country. Although studies show that they do 
indeed make an important contribution to the stability of peace, a new dimension of 
soft power approach could deepen these processes. The emerging European Union 
peacebuilding framework sets a new normative structure reaffirming that a bottom-up, 
non-coercive approach is needed. Many scholars, such as John P. Lederach, suggest 
that there are ways to “build creative responses to patterns of self-perpetuating 
violence in a complex system made up of multiple actors, with activities that are 
happening at the same time.”1 Perhaps stopping the shooting and killing is the first 
step in a very long process of healing among the community members affected by the 
conflicts.  
                                                
1  John P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 33. 
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Although a set of tools has already been developed within the peacebuilding 
context, such as various reconciliation and truth commissions, training and advocacy 
programs, peacekeeping, transitional justice, demobilization and disarmament efforts 
and many others, it seems that they all focus on military and political arrangements. 
Many scholars have been criticizing the liberal approach to peacebuilding, which rests 
on promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and other processes 
associated with modern state building but which often overlook the needs and 
capabilities of local populations. These approaches are widely criticised for being 
expressions of hegemony or neo-colonialism by authors such as Johan Galtung and 
Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo. Cycles of violence are perpetuated because externally 
imposed values and aspirations do not coincide with needs of local populations. 
Everyday life of communities is overlooked as the upper apparatus of governance is 
being built. Additionally, the imposition of Western values can further cause political, 
economic and cultural isolation as societies in question attempt to preserve their 
fragile ecosystems.  
Because of such criticisms, the issue of “local ownership” is emerging in 
many articles, underlining the fact that local stakeholders are not sufficiently engaged. 
In recent years, a new wave of study has emerged within the peacebuilding field, 
which underlines the importance of community-based approaches.  
As part of this trend, this research will evaluate the effects of arts-based 
programmes and cultural work as a tool to contribute to peacebuilding. My hypothesis 
is that in order to build a lasting peace, adding a cultural component to peacebuilding, 
is just as important as other efforts at post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction 
such as establishing democracy, market economics, secular authority, institutions of 
justice and strengthening the state. Specifically, I hypothesise that introducing 
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strategic arts-based programs with local content can have a significant impact on 
raising awareness about peaceful solutions to everyday problems affecting post-
conflict societies and therefore strengthening the community. In other words, 
responses, attitudes and behaviours in relation to the conflict can be transformed 
through arts.  
 I base my hypothesis on critical literature developed, in particular, by John P. 
Richmond, who elaborates on the need for a bottom up approach. Richmond notes 
that traditional peacebuilding leaves room for interpretation because of the coercive 
top-down nature of interventions. Richmond suggests that not enough attention is 
being paid to the underlying causes of conflict and therefore current efforts towards 
peacebuilding are not entirely inclusive and lack the understanding of local dynamics. 
That is especially the case in regions such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Richmond criticises 
the current approach to peacebuilding on other grounds as well:  
In many post-violence environments local perceptions of the liberal peace 
project and its statebuilding focus indicate it to be ethically bankrupt, subject 
to double standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned with the 
social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects.2  
 
Richmond and his colleagues describe the current approach to peacebuilding 
as “peacebuilding consensus” which includes “victor’s peace,” the “institutional 
peace,” the “constitutional peace” and the “civil peace.”3 These represent four 
generations of peacebuilding based on Western values such as democratization, 
liberalization, human rights, development and free trade. Richmond defines the 
“peacebuilding consensus” as follows: 
Peacebuilding consensus is […] a nascent discourse and practice of both 
means and ends. This includes methods for the amelioration of conflict 
                                                
2  Oliver P. Richmond, "A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday," Review of International 
Studies 35, no. 3 (Jul., 2009), p. 557-580. 
3  Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler, "The Emerging EU Peacebuilding 
Framework: Confirming Or Transcending Liberal Peacebuilding?" Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 24, no. 3 (09, 2011), p. 449-469. 
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through mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, 
prevention, and transformation approaches, and development strategies 
incorporating multiple actors in a multidimensional process.4 
 
 
The first three generations have been guiding policy makers for the past three 
decades. They all focus mainly on security and institutional and constitutional reform. 
Although they do engage with civil society, their focus is on the development of the 
liberal state. The basic idea is that order can only be achieved and maintained when 
security is provided and when basic institutions are functional.  
First generation approaches can be termed “conflict management.” The 
violence is stopped and the peacekeepers are maintaining the status quo. It is a top-
down, coercive approach, where external actors such as military forces are engaged to 
provide security and territorial integrity, combat terrorism and regulate arms trade.  
Sub-state actors and institutions are largely excluded. Although conflict is seemingly 
resolved through enforcement of rules and mediation, the roots of violence are not 
addressed. US-led interventions in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan are cases of first 
generation or “victor’s peace” type of liberal peacebuilding.  
Second generation, or “institutional peace” aims at mobilizing grassroots 
movements to build state institutions with the help of international actors. It is still 
imposed or top-down and coercive type of governance. But it is a step further in 
peacebuilding efforts as it addresses the economic and political barriers as sources of 
conflict. Bosnia and Kosovo during the early phases are good examples.  
Third generation or “constitutional peace” aims to create a liberal state 
through a partly top-down, partly bottom-up approach. After security issues are 
addressed, the liberal statebuilding project is carried through in order to introduce fair 
                                                
4  Oliver P. Richmond, "The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus," 
Cooperation and Conflict 39, no. 2 (June 01, 2004), p. 129-150. 
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and free elections, respect for human rights and other democratic principles. Civil 
society engagement is crucial in facilitating the transition along with consensual 
negotiations with elites. Conditionality is also a means through which democratic 
governance is built. East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia or Cambodia are some possible 
case studies.5  
What is important to my work is the fourth generation or “civil peace.” This 
new post-liberal framework focuses on civil society and is concerned with the “needs 
and rights” of populations:  
The next graduation represents a more critical form of the liberal peace. This 
emancipatory model is concerned with needs as well as rights (and a blurring 
line between these categories), and a much closer relationship of custodians 
with local ownership. This is a bottom-up approach with a strong concern for 
social welfare and justice. It equates to civil peace and generally is not state-
led but shaped by NGOs, trade unions, advocacy and social movements.6 
 
The everyday life of citizens with respect to their local cultural norms and traditions 
becomes the basis of the fourth generation peacebuilding. Populations who desire 
liberal peace must in the first place be able to relate to each other on a day-to-day 
basis. In other words, there needs to be a dialogue or some form of communication 
between the citizens in order for them to profit from institutional frameworks 
available to them in a latter stage. Richmond argues that there is also a need to go 
beyond the notion of local leadership: 
From a liberal reformist perspective, what needs to be considered is how to 
identify the rights, resources, identity, welfare, cultural disposition, and 
ontological hybridity that would make liberal states, institutionalism, and 
governance viable in everyday liberal and non-liberal contexts. This requires 
an engagement with not just the currently fashionable and controversial issues 
of local ownership or local participation, but the far deeper ‘local-local’ (that 
is, not merely a veneer of internationally sponsored local actors and NGOs 
                                                
5  Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler, The Emerging EU Peacebuilding 
Framework: Confirming Or Transcending Liberal Peacebuilding?, Vol. 24 (Routledge, 2011), p. 449-
469. 
6 Oliver P. Richmond, "A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday," Review of International 
Studies 35, no. 3 (Jul., 2009), p. 557-580. 
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constituting ‘civil’ as opposed to ‘uncivil’ society), which allows for genuine 
self-government, self-determination, democracy and human rights7 
 
The European Union, for example, advocates the fourth generation approach and 
focuses on certain key areas such as sustainable peace, human security, and 
“responsibility to protect” and also puts an emphasis, among other tasks, on 
enhancing the civil dialogue through civil society actors. It favours non-military 
policies in order to promote social justice through “engagement with others, their 
alterity, cultures and identities.”8 The European Union’s normative legacy relies on 
“soft power” and this seems to be true also regarding the peacebuilding efforts. 
Although the EU’s aspirations head in the direction of a bottom-up approach and 
could therefore incorporate strategic-based peacebuilding in their programs, it remains 
a challenge to see them implemented. Building on Richmond, I seek in this thesis to 
identify appropriate local strategies.  
The approach I will use builds on liberal theory as resting on a “bottom-up” 
approach to world politics, in which the interests of individuals and groups are central 
and cooperation is possible even though harmony of interests is difficult to achieve 
and conflict may erupt over irreconcilable beliefs, scarce goods or power among 
others.9  
On the other hand, it addresses to some degree the concerns, already 
discussed, of the critical theorists who focus on the fact that the peacebuilding 
consensus could in fact disguise the hegemonic aspirations of Western donors. It also 
conforms to a constructivist view in that constructivism offers a theoretical lens, 
which emphasizes the role of norms, culture and ideas in shaping the social fabric of a 
                                                
7  Ibid.  
8  Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler, The Emerging EU Peacebuilding 
Framework: Confirming Or Transcending Liberal Peacebuilding?, Vol. 24 (Routledge, 2011), p. 449-
469. 
9  Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics: 
Erratum," International Organization 52, no. 1 (Winter, 1998), p. 229. 
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society. In the context of my thesis, it explains why promoting non-violent ways of 
conflict-resolution, in other words, promoting new norms and behaviours can lead to a 
more lasting peace. Helbing et al. identify two processes of establishing norms and 
argue that in local environments individuals are able to create norms.  
When adaptive group pressure is considered, local social norms may 
spontaneously be created by random variations in individual behaviors, even 
in settings, where everybody would tend to show the personally preferred 
behavior. A precondition is that social interactions are focused on a 
sufficiently small neighborhood. Then, local behavioral majorities will sooner 
or later occur by coincidence, and group pressure will reinforce them. This 
gives rise to local conformity, i.e. local norms, which are then spreading into 
areas where everybody is still showing the personally preferred behavior.10 
 
Their argument helps to explain why working at the community level could be more 
effective in establishing the resort to peaceful means of solving disputes as a new 
norm.  
 These liberal, critical and constructivist views can be applied to my cultural 
approach, which is itself endorsed by scholars such as Cynthia Cohen and Olivier 
Urbain. My approach is based on the idea that “strategic arts” can be effective in 
building peace. In the next section, I explain in greater detail how arts and culture can 
be employed to build peace with a local face.  
	  
Nexus of Arts, Culture and Peacebuilding  
 Culture is often mentioned as one of the components that should be taken into 
consideration during the peacebuilding process. What the term means within this 
specific context and why it is so crucial is rarely explained. Geertz suggests that 
culture is “the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their 
experience and guide their action. … [It is] expressed in symbolic forms by means of 
                                                
10  Dirk Helbing et al., "Conditions for the Emergence of Shared Norms in Populations with 
Incompatible Preferences," PLoS ONE 9, no. 8 (08, 2014), p. 12. 
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which people communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and 
attitudes toward life.”11 
Culture can be therefore understood as a collective framework which guides 
the lives of people on an everyday basis. This framework consists of experiences, 
symbols, rituals, values, traditions, social structures and rules of interaction. 
Altogether they shape each individual’s view of the world, help relate to it and relate 
to others in his or her community.12 Because it is a shared structure, it also guides the 
ways people see and engage or disengage in conflict. Lisa Schirch notes that cultural 
groups develop a common memory of what they interpret as traumatic experience. 
They choose specific moments in history, which are passed on from generation to 
generation, becoming symbols worth fighting for.13 Cultural groups also develop their 
own ways to handle conflict, including language, to best describe their experiences. 
Often, complex rituals involving what we would call art performances are in place to 
address differences. Schirch argues that using the existing cultural frameworks could 
offer peacebuilders a range of powerful tools in dealing with conflict.14 Subsequently, 
Cynthia Cohen poses a very important question: “what are the risks involved in 
transplanting a cultural form from one culture into another setting?”15 It is crucial to 
ask what meaning or connotation Western culture has in African countries, which 
have suffered so many years of colonisation. Cohen further explains, that certain art 
forms are embedded in sacred domains (e.g. some traditions of African drumming) 
while others are secular.16 Culturally appropriate methodologies are therefore key 
                                                
11  Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
12  Lisa Schirch, Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2005), p. 44-
45. 
13  Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15  Olivier Urbain and Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, Music and Conflict 
Transformation: Harmonies and Dissonances in Geopolitics (London: I.B Tauris in association with 
the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, 2008). 
16 Ibid., 38. 
 
 14 
because without the local knowledge peacebuilding efforts could be very difficult to 
achieve.  
Arts can refer to a very large set of phenomena. For the purpose of this study, 
Cynthia Cohen’s approach is the most useful.17  For her, arts include a spectrum of art 
forms such as painting, photography, dance, theatre, poetry, music, movies and 
expressions of local folklore. They can all be very powerful tools in peacebuilding 
processes. My study focuses on particular programs referred to as strategic arts based 
programs. By strategic arts-based programs I refer to a concept elaborated by Shank 
and Schirch: 
By strategic, the authors mean that arts based methodologies be conceptually 
grounded, coordinated with other forms of peacebuilding approaches, infused with 
long term perspective vis-à-vis the nature of social change, and serious about 
evaluating their effectiveness and impact. … If the arts are going to be useful to the 
field of peace building, it is necessary to know what the arts contribute to 
peacebuilding, when different art forms are appropriate in the cycle of conflict, and 
how the arts are so effective in their contribution to peacebuilding. John Paul 
Lederach calls this analytical process the ‘strategic what’, the ‘strategic when’ and the 
‘strategic how’ of peacebuilding.18 
 
In other words, it is important to understand not only the cycles of conflict, but also 
the local cultural background and the needs of local populations. The first step is the 
strategic what, or in other words the difficult choice between many existing methods 
of conflict resolution. Shank and Schirch propose the following methods: 1) waging 
conflict non-violently, 2) reducing direct violence, 3) transforming relationships and 
4) building capacity.19  
Rama Mani adds to this by focusing on a specific aspect of peacebuilding, 
namely transitional justice, and how aesthetic and creative means can help in pursuing 
                                                
17  Cynthia Cohen, "Creative Approaches to Reconciliation," in The Psychology of Resolving Global 
Conflicts: From War to Peace, eds. Mari Fitzduff and Christopher E. Stout, Vol. Volume 3 
Interventions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), p. 4. 
18  Michael Shank and Lisa Schirch, "Strategic Arts-Based Peacebuilding," Peace & Change 33, no. 2 
(04, 2008), p. 218-219. 
19  Ibid. 
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justice after violent conflicts.20 The author sees the arts and culture at large as a means 
to pursue a more inclusive approach to justice, which would take into account not 
only direct victims and perpetrators but also bystanders and the population at large. 
This method would involve in the process all members of the community “based on 
their shared culture and notwithstanding personal or group differences.”21 Mani 
acknowledges the diverse needs of populations emerging from violent conflict, which 
cannot be addressed by a single mechanism of transitional justice, such as trials or 
truth commissions. Cultural justice emerges as a response and another dimension of 
peacebuilding efforts. 
Strategic when refers to accurate timing. Each conflict goes through the initial 
phase of increase in violence, which then progresses and eventually diminishes. 
Certain above-mentioned approaches, such as “waging conflict non-violently” could 
have tragic effects when initiated after violence has spiralled out of control.22 On this 
note, Lederach makes a very interesting observation, which is crucial to 
understanding post-conflict environments. He argues that the use of the word “post-
conflict” is in many ways misleading as it suggests the conflict has indeed ended. 
However, signing peace agreements merely signifies that the warring parties found a 
solution and that if they follow certain procedures, there is a possibility of a peaceful 
end.23 Many conflicts continue long after the agreements are signed, specifically 
because there is a need to redefine relationships. Arts offer creative solutions to 
breaking the cycles of violence by offering an outside perspective on conflict and 
                                                
20 Rama Mani, "Women, Art and Post-Conflict Justice," International Criminal Law Review 11, no. 3 
(07, 2011), p. 543-560. 
21 Ibid., 551. 
22 Michael Shank and Lisa Schirch, Strategic Arts-Based Peacebuilding, Vol. 33Wiley-Blackwell, 
2008), p. 217-242. 
23 John P.  John P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 43-49. 
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promoting peaceful responses. He also underlines the role of imagination in initiating 
the positive change within violence-affected communities. 
Sustaining peaceful transformation in settings of deep-rooted violence requires a 
long-term view that focuses as much on the people in the setting of conflict building 
durable and flexible processes as it does on specific solutions. We move away from 
an image of a single rising bell curve, the line in time with an agreement as its 
product. We move toward the image of a transformative platform: ongoing social and 
relational spaces, in other words people in relationship who generate responsive 
initiatives for constructive change.24 
 
Finally, the strategic how reflects the concerns presented here in previous 
paragraphs, namely, how to built responses which are culturally appropriate and 
effective. Within this discourse, the individuals participating in arts programs are 
resources instead of recipients. Local knowledge of art forms and rituals used to 
resolve conflicts become a basis of peacebuilding work. The discussion of how 
touches upon other subjects and disciplines where various scholars come up with best 
practices regarding specific issues related to post-conflict recovery. Escuata and 
Butterwick point out that visual arts can “contribute to collective recovery from and 
reconstruction after trauma.”25 Survivors of violent conflicts witnessed horrific 
atrocities and unfortunately, in most developing nations, counselling or psychological 
support is unavailable and they are left on their own to deal with the consequences. 
The effects of trauma are well documented and can result in “significantly 
disempowering distress and physical, emotional, psychological and spiritual 
impairment.”26 Additionally, people are constantly reliving the traumatic events in 
their minds, which changes their way of seeing the reality and dealing with others in 
their communities. Failure to address this issue can result in a never-ending spiral of 
violence, as most individual members of affected communities are not 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Mok Escueta and Shauna Butterwick, "The Power of Popular Education and Visual Arts for Trauma 
Survivors’ Critical Consciousness and Collective Action," International Journal of Lifelong Education 
31, no. 3 (May, 2012), p. 325-340. 
26 Ibid., 325. 
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psychologically stable. The article by Escuate and Butterwick and works of other 
scholars such as art therapist Marian Liebman, are significant in that they underline 
the importance of looking into other fields of the social sciences in order to better 
understand the human factor in the peacebuilding effort. 27 
 It seems important to answer one more question: why arts-based programs 
supposedly transform relationships. Cynthia Cohen suggests that based on studies in 
cognitive psychology, the author suggests, that “rational deliberations alone are 
unlikely to be sufficient to rebuild inter-communal relations in the aftermath of ethnic 
conflict.”28 Processes such as art and ritual can address some of the challenges related 
to coexistence and reconciliation. Arts can involve people in sensory experiences, 
though non-verbal communications such as visual arts and symbols, hearing sounds 
and observing bodily expressions. All of these, if rooted in native culture, have the 
power to transform the individuals involved in the process of instant creation. 
Therefore Cohen proposes an approach which takes into account the existing cultural 
framework and uses ritual as a means to overcome the limitations of verbal 
expression.29 She further explains, that arts offer an outside perspective on conflict 
and the “Other.”  
Finally, cultural diplomacy emerges as yet another way to incorporate culture 
to the peacebuilding efforts on an international level. The ideal of cultural exchange 
can be seen as a non-coercive strategy used by states to advance their interests and 
built relationships with the ‘Other.’ For example Memis explores the role of the 
British Council in advancing cultural relations and public diplomacy. According to 
the author, cooperation though cultural relations can enhance international trust and 
                                                
27 Marian Liebman, Arts Approaches to Conflict (London; Bristol, Pa.: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 
1996). 
28 Cynthia  Cynthia Cohen, Creative Approaches to Reconciliation, eds. Mari Fitzduff and Christopher 
E. Stout, Vol. Volume 3 Interventions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), p. 69-102. 
29 Ibid., 73. 
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“contribute towards a stable world.”30 On the other hand, it should be noted that many 
scholars, such as D.Y. Jin, Kalyani Chadha and Anandam Kavoori, are critical of 
cultural diplomacy because from the perspective of instrumentalism it can in fact be a 
propaganda tool. Once again a local approach would be helpful here.  
Research Design 
In proceeding to analyze the relationship between culture (that is strategic arts-
based programs) and peacebuilding, I will use a case study approach. In order to 
support my hypothesis, I first identify four cases of civil wars, which ended and 
subsequently entered a post-conflict stage of reconstruction. These cases were chosen 
from the Middle East, Africa and Asia in order to give a broad global context. They 
are post-conflict: Yemen, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nepal. In each case, the 
United Nations and various NGOs have been playing an active role in state building 
through development of state institutions, promotion of democracy, disarmament 
efforts and other peacebuilding tools. I then identify arts-based programs at the 
community level, which have emerged during this post-conflict stage to see if any of 
them have the potential to contribute to more lasting peace, which I define in terms of 
strong and united communities, able to transform conflicts and establish resorts to 
peaceful means by participants in settling daily disputes. For the purpose of this study 
I have located three such programs, one in each country, implemented by Search for 
Common Ground (SCG) in cooperation with local actors.  
The first program, Strengthening repatriation and reintegration through 
information and conflict transformation, targeted the communities in Democratic 
Republic of Congo. One of its objectives was the enhancement of conflict resolution 
capacities of local actors, including returnees and residents as well as local authorities, 
                                                
30 Sharon Memis, "The Impact of International Cultural Engagement: The British Council's Approach 
to Evaluation," Journal of Arts Management, Law & Society 39, no. 4 (Winter2010, 2009), p. 292-297. 
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through participatory theatre. This art form was used to offer a platform where 
communities can observe their own conflicts played out by actors and subsequently 
are invited themselves to perform and engage in peaceful conflict resolution. 
The second program, The Team, incorporated a television drama as a way to 
promote positive messages among the Yemenis in order to shift attitudes towards 
greater tolerance among the country’s sectarian, ethnic, political, and socio-economic 
groups. The TV series was also played at the “viewing sessions” open to public. 
Following the screening of episodes debate was encouraged to gather all differing 
opinions on a specific topic to reach a common understanding or conclusion. 
The third program, Peace Process Communication Campaign, was 
implemented in Nepal and involved the creation of peace songs by people of different 
ethnic backgrounds in order to promote national unity, reconciliation and tolerance. 
The peace songs respected various cultural practices and incorporated musical 
instruments of different ethnic groups. They were eventually played during a live 
concert, which attracted hundreds of people, and was broadcast by the most popular 
TV channel and the radio stations across the country. The songs’ creation process 
involved dialogue and various exercises with the goal to strengthen the community 
bonds between artists from different ethnic backgrounds.  
My next step is to describe the programs in detail in order to make the case 
that they can significantly strengthen the communities by raising awareness and 
promoting positive responses to conflict where there had been none before. If I find 
that these programs have worked well in terms of participants’ resort to peaceful 
methods, I will conclude that they are effective in building a more lasting peace than 
traditional peacebuilding programs. However, these programs may also have their 
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limitations and if so, I will present these problems in detail. In Chapter 2 I will present 




   
 
Chapter 2: Democratic Republic of Congo 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) gained its independence from 
Belgium in 1960. That same year the country fell into a civil war after Katanga 
province declared its secession. One of the first UN peacekeeping missions, the 
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was established to stabilize the 
country with little to no effect. From 1966 until the First Congolese War, DRC 
experienced many years of severe mismanagement under the presidency of Joseph 
Desire Mobutu. For the purpose of this study, I will focus on the most recent 
developments, namely the First and Second Congolese Wars, which have claimed the 
lives of an estimated 3.9 million people.1  
  The First Congolese War began in 1996 in the aftermath of the genocide, 
which took place in Rwanda from April to July 1994. When a Tutsi-led patriotic front 
seized power in Kigali, 2 million ethnic Hutu refugees crossed the border from 
Rwanda to DRC in order to avoid prosecution. Among the refugees there were around 
50,000 Hutu militia soldiers who were responsible for the massacres and who sought 
refuge in the camps, looting and killing local Tutsi population.2 The weak Congolese 
government was not able to control the militia. The new regime in Kigali was not only 
feeling threatened by the remaining armed groups across the border, but also grew 
deeply dissatisfied with Mobutu’s regime. In order to legitimize an invasion, Rwanda 
organized a coalition supported by Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, which all contributed troops and political support to fight the militias and 
                                                
1  Eirin Mobekk, "Security Sector Reform and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Protecting Civilians in the East," International Peacekeeping (13533312) 16, no. 2 (04, 2009) p. 2. 
2  Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo : Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 69-70. 
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the Mobutu regime.3 Additionally, a new ethnic Tutsi leader Laurent Kabila, 
supported by Rwanda and other states, was found to be a prefect candidate to lead a 
rebellion within the DRC. Kabila formed an anti-Mobutu rebel group: Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (AFDL). A full-scale 
national and regional war was triggered, which led to Mobutu’s ouster after a series of 
clear victories by the AFDL. In May 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila became a new 
president.  
Shortly after, new tensions arose when his backers, Rwanda and Uganda, 
accused Kabila of supporting Rwandan rebel groups. This led to a new invasion of 
DRC by these two states in August 1998, which sparked the Second Congolese War. 
A new rebel group was also formed with the support of Rwanda and Uganda: the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). This time Kabila sought support from 
neighboring countries and with the help of Angola, Zimbabwe and to a lesser degree 
Namibia and Sudan, he was able to defend Kinshasa and stay in power.4 As the 
fighting continued, the state became weaker leaving the vacuum filled by quickly 
multiplying rebel groups. In addition to already established militias, former supporters 
of Mobutu organized themselves around Jean-Pierre Bemba to form the Congo 
Liberation Movement (MLC). That same year, international actors entered the scene 
and intensive mediation eventually led to a cease-fire signed in Lusaka in 1999. It was 
never really observed and the fighting continued.  
In 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard. His son, Joseph 
Kabila came to power. The new president was trusted by Western powers and slow 
progress was made, which culminated in a series of agreements signed in 2002 and 
                                                
3  Ibid.; Pak Nung Wong, "Discerning an African Post-Colonial Governance Imbroglio: Colonialism, 
Underdevelopment and Violent Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and 
Sierra Leone," African & Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (01, 2012), p. 79. 
4  Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 71. 
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2003, notably the Pretoria and Luanda agreements. Officially, the foreign troops were 
supposed to withdraw from DRC by the end of 2002. The representatives of warring 
rebel groups were incorporated to the Transitional Government. However, when 
elections were held in 2006, many were not able to stay in power: the RCD controlled 
roughly a third of DRC territory and secured only a few seats representation in the 
new legislature. This was a spark which incited a new rebellion led by General 
Laurent Nkunda heading the National Congress for the Defense of the People 
(CNDP).5 Rwanda once again sided with the new rebel group to maintain its influence 
in the resource rich DRC. It was only in 2009, that the two countries signed an 
agreement, which incorporated the CNDP into the Congolese army. However, in 2012 
the 2009 peace deal collapsed, when CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda launched a 
mutiny and took half of CNDP officers with him. Again, the group called Movement 
of March 23 (M23) received support from Rwanda.  
Finally, in 2013 two important peace agreements were signed which ended the 
M23 rebellion. Some experts argue, that although fighting in DRC continues, there 
are signs of a serious peace process.6 I will now proceed to describe in detail how the 
international and regional actors have responded to the conflict and how that has 
shaped the current approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in DRC. I 
will then evaluate the efficacy of these approaches.  
Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction Efforts in DRC 
It is important to note that from 2002, international actors labeled the DRC as 
a “post conflict” environment and set up their response accordingly. That is because 
various diplomats saw the 2002-2003 peace agreements as the end of war. Between 
2003 and 2006 the international involvement in the DRC reached unprecedented 
                                                
5  Jason K. Stearns, "Helping Congo Help Itself," Foreign Affairs 92, no. 5 (Sep, 2013), p. 99-112. 
6  Ibid. 
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levels. It was oriented towards post-conflict reconstruction efforts such as 
disbursement of development aid by the European Union (EU) and establishment of 
peacekeeping operations by the UN. 
Following the Lusaka cease-fire agreement signed in 1999, the United Nations 
Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (MONUC) with the purpose of overseeing the disarmament process and 
supervising the withdrawal of foreign troops. It took several months before the 
mission was operational and since then it has been expanding both in mandate and in 
size.7 The Lusaka agreement did not produce intended outcomes and the international 
community, including the United States, UN, EU, the Organization of African Unity 
and a few African countries (notably South Africa, Zambi and Libya), brought the 
warring parties to a negotiating table once more in 2002. The Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue ended with the signing of a Final Act in 2003. One of the most important 
frameworks developed during this period was the Global and All-Inclusive 
Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It became the 
basis for the creation of the Transitional Government and the official beginning of a 
path towards lasting peace and democracy in DRC. The approach taken was a top-
down solution, which dealt mostly with political issues of governance: 
As mandated in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement ‘the 1+4 model’ (‘le schéma 
1+4’) structured the transitional government. The administration included one 
president (Joseph Kabila) and four vice presidents drawn from the RCD-G (Azarias 
Ruberwa), the MLC (Jean-Pierre Bemba), Kabila’s former government (Abdoulaye 
Yerodia Ndombasi), and a coalition of unarmed parties gathered under the name the 
Political Opposition (Arthur Z’ahidi Ngoma). In the lower echelons, such as the 
ministries, the parliament, and other administrative capacities (like the governorship 
of a province), representation was supposedly equally divided among the eight 
‘components of the transition,’ corresponding to the eight most powerful political or 
military groups turned political parties at the outset of the civil war...8 
 
                                                
7  Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo : Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 72. 
8  Ibid. 
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Additionally, a strategy was developed to integrate the rebels from various 
groups into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and police units, 
which were to be dispatched in all provinces to maintain order until the elections 
period in 2006. Although the peace process seemed promising, violence continued in 
the eastern provinces, notably Maniema and North Katanga. Respectively, in 2005 
and 2006, the referendum on a new constitution and general legislative and 
presidential elections were held. The National Assembly was installed and Joseph 
Kabila became president.9  
The newly elected leader was cautious about the outside involvement and 
eventually pushed the Western capitals to disengage politically, while the peace 
process was still very fragile. Eventually, the UN-led International Committee in 
Support of the Transition sharply reduced its assistance, while the peacekeepers were 
focusing on protecting the civilians and could only engage in reactive firefights 
without tackling the root causes of conflict. However, financial aid flowed into the 
country and a policy of stabilization was adopted. In 2009, the Congolese government 
declared that the conflict was over and introduced the Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Congo (STAREC). With the help of Western donors, 
the program focused on reconstruction: building infrastructure, deploying state agents 
to rural areas and adjusting the economy. However, the administrative buildings and 
roads lacked maintenance, while the officials were often abusive. According to UN 
officials, these various efforts were “disconnected from the wishes of the local 
population [and] perceived as predatory.” 10 The international efforts towards 
reconstruction also included training of the Congolese army units. Issues emerged 
when the foreign officers would receive reports claiming the soldiers they trained 
                                                
9  Ibid. 
10  Jason K. Stearns, Helping Congo Help Itself, Vol. 92Foreign Affairs, 2013), p. 99-112. 
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were not fed or paid. The ultimate blow came with a 2012 investigation indicating 
that US-trained army units participated in a mass rape in the town of Minova (Eastern 
DRC).  
When the political instability in DRC was aggravated by 2011 flawed general 
elections and the following mutiny of CNDP officers, the M23 rebel movement 
pushed the international community to act more robustly. The UN deployed the first-
ever combat brigade to intervene militarily in DRC. Former President of Ireland, 
Mary Robinson, was appointed a special envoy for the Great Lakes region in order to 
instill peace in the region. The expanded UN peacekeeping mission changed its name 
to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Congo (MONUSCO) and 
is now the largest police force and peacekeeping mission worldwide.11 The Peace, 
Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
Region was signed by regional powers in February 2013. A few months later, M23 
rebel group finally came to the negotiating table and on 12 December 2013 signed the 
Nairobi Declaration. A 2015 report of the UN Secretary-General on the 
implementation of these regional agreements indicates that progress has been made 
and that the Great Lakes region has enjoyed a relative stability. However, the effort to 
neutralize armed groups in Eastern DRC and the slow disarmament process have been 
mentioned as some of the challenges. The report further indicates that 2,7 million 
people are internally displaced and around “5,2 million people are affected by 
conflict, malnutrition, epidemics and natural disasters.”12  
                                                
11  Tala Dowlatshahi, "Congo Army Rapes Detailed in UN Report as Special Brigade Arrives," 
http://passblue.com/2013/05/15/congo-army-rapes-detailed-in-un-report-as-special-brigade-arrives/ 
(accessed 12/15, 2014).  
12 Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation 
Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, S/2015/173 (New York: UN 
Security Council,[2015a]). http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1506050.pdf. 
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The DRC conflict remains one of the largest ongoing humanitarian crises in 
the world and many scholars are attempting to investigate why after so many years of 
intense peacebuilding efforts, the violence continues. Autesserre suggests that the 
issue of ethnic tensions between the Congolese of Rwandan descent and the 
indigenous communities had been present before the war began.13 The micro-level 
antagonisms have continued to incite violence, and local leaders have used disputing 
groups to achieve their own political goals.  
[…] many local conflicts became autonomous from the national and regional 
developments, most notably in South Kivu, North Katanga, and Ituri. There, local 
disputes over political power, economic resources (especially land and mining sites), 
and social status led to clashes that no national or regional actors could stop. The 
humanitarian cost was staggering.14 
 
Autesserre further argues that the international community failed to address 
the causes of micro-level violence. The top-down approach was instead advocated and 
prescribed procedures were applied with a complete abandonment of grassroots 
peacebuilding. Additionally, peacekeepers themselves lacked cohesion, were 
sometimes unresponsive and eventually became unpopular with the local populations 
who called them “tourists in the war zone.”15  
Based on interviews with interveners, Autesserre was able to identify two 
main reasons why the international community saw grassroots peacebuilding as 
ineffective. First of all, the UN officials she was able to interview, claimed that the 
conflict was provoked by politicians and leaders of groups who were seeking power 
over the territories rich in natural resources and therefore, a top-down approach was 
the only effective solution. Secondly, addressing very complex local conflicts would 
involve a coherent strategy as well as financial, logistic and political resources, which 
                                                
13  Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 30-31. 
14  Ibid., 178. 
15  Ibid., 114.  
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were unavailable to most organizations. In 2002, following the publication of the 
Brahimi Report, the UN adopted a new approach to peacebuilding, which would 
include the bottom-up work in the mandate of MONUC. Unfortunately, it never 
materialized and humanitarian staff members remained neutral and apolitical. 
Similarly in 2005, renewed efforts were made, however, they merely focused on 
emergency relief such as “primary care and food distribution, water and sanitation 
projects, and medical and psychological assistance to the victims of sexual 
violence.”16 In sum, the international interventions included three major elements: 1) 
political - focusing on the regional and national elite, 2) military – aiming at 
deployment of peacekeepers, and 3) humanitarian – addressing the consequences of 
violence, which also represented one of a few isolated cases of involvement with the 
local populations. Other limited attempts at local peacebuilding were implemented by 
NGOs such as Life and Peace Institute or Search for Common ground, which were the 
main international agencies working on a local level to maintain peace in the DRC. I 
will now proceed to evaluate their efforts. 
Participatory Theater in DRC – Search for Common Ground 
 Participatory theater for conflict transformation has been used by Search for 
Common Ground (SCG) in different corners of the world to enable people in conflict 
to find peaceful ways of addressing the daily disputes in their lives. It tackles conflicts 
linked to resources, refugees, land rights, corruption, sexual violence and prejudice.17 
It involves techniques which allow the actors to interact with the public based on a 
real problem. Eventually, the audience engages and participates in a performance to 
adapt, change or correct a situation or a behavior that is being developed during the 
                                                
16  Ibid., 205-206. 
17  Progress Report 2012 (Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground,[2012a]). 
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show. Participatory theater gives people the space to transform their conflicts without 
violence.  
Since 2005, Search for Common Ground (SCG) has performed more than 
10,000 participatory theater shows in DRC and has reached hundreds of thousands of 
people across the country. I will now explain in more detail what participatory theater 
is and why it is used as a tool to transform conflict. I will then present the quantitative 
and qualitative data to assess the efficacy of the program Strengthening repatriation 
and reintegration through information and conflict transformation. The data was 
published by SCG in the final evaluation report.  
 
Figure 2.1. Participatory Theatre Performance. From: Participatory Theatre for Conflict 
Transformation: Training Manual (Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground) 
 
The participatory theater can take different forms including Forum Theater, 
Debate Theater, Image Theater, Playback Theater or Invisible Theater. All the styles 
incorporate the audience’s participation as the main feature of the show. There are a 
few important steps that have to be taken in a specific sequence in order to produce a 
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successful performance. They are: 1) information collection, 2) compiling 
information, 3) scene development, 4) character development, 5) preparation of the 
performance location, 6) interaction with spectators, 7) role of the director. First, 
actors approach the community members and collect information about the way 
people live, including the cultural aspects and customs, conflicts they experience and 
who are the participants, religious norms and the community structure. After 
identifying the disputes, which most often create violence, the actors proceed to 
develop a story based on a chosen conflict. The performance location is then selected 
in a visible, secure and accessible place. The show is promoted in collaboration with 
local authorities through radio, posters, and public announcements in schools and 
churches. An effort is made to invite all community members, including security 
forces, police and elders.18 
The actors are Congolese and go through training in the participatory theater 
techniques. They sometimes were victims or perpetrators of violence and had direct 
experience of conflict. The performance begins by welcoming the audience and 
incorporates various elements of local culture, including singing, drumming and 
dance to attract attention and build trust. Music is also used during the show to 
transition between different scenes and the show uses “contemporary popular music 
that is rooted in the local context” or songs created by actors that express emotions 
such as sadness or joy.19 After the introduction, the conductor explains what is the 
goal of the show and encourages the audience to participate in the final stage of the 
play. At this moment, the public is invited to enter the stage and play out the roles 
previously assigned to actors. This time instead of violent responses they must come 
up with an alternative peaceful ending to the conflict they just witnessed. That way 
                                                
18  Participatory Theater for Conflict Transformation: Training Manual (Washington, DC: Search for 
Common Ground,[b]).) 
19  Ibid. 
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the audience members become engaged in establishing and promoting the non-violent 
means of resolving daily disputes. Some performances end with a debate where 
dialogue between community members is encouraged to address specific problems.20  
There are multiple reasons why participatory theater can help build a lasting 
peace among local communities. First of all, it offers a forum where the marginalized 
populations can raise their voice and speak about the issues they face in daily life in a 
neutral environment. Because it is performed in public, the audience can be anyone 
who arrives, making theater accessible and inclusive to random populations. By 
witnessing the conflicts as spectators the community members become detached and 
are able to perceive the problems from a different viewpoint. On the other hand, the 
performer seeks to offer the public alternative ways to understand the conflict 
narrative.  
Through performance art interventions, the past can be reexamined, reinvented and 
retold in a public venue. Through a process agreed upon by the performer and the 
audience, storytelling can explore multiple perceptions of an event despite obstacles 
that would deter such an exchange under a different process.21  
 
Artists can be seen as “moral instructors who can offer moral guidance 
through creative expression.”22 Although the performance presents attitudes and 
behaviors, which might be difficult to imagine for war-torn societies, they could 
nevertheless be adopted in the long run. Additionally, art offers the potential to see the 
“Other” from a different perspective. It allows the spectator to observe both sides to a 
dispute and understand how underlying causes and claims by both parties are rooted 
in shared humanity and anchored in the same cultural environment. This new 
perception is possible because of an alternative reality, which is created during the 
performance.  
                                                
20  Ibid. 
21  Dena L. Hawes, Why Arts Matter: Artists and Peacebuilding (Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. 
Muller, 2009), p. 41. 
22  Ibid., 42. 
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The term alternative reality refers to a conscious psychological altering of place, in 
which the individual accepts that the events and situations he or she sees have a 
creative or make-believe reality. By observing imaginary scenarios, the viewer can 
take in multiple perspectives of a conflict. Storytelling used in performance art 
interventions utilizes dialogical communication within an imaginary environment 
between performer and listener. It is important not to discount this make-believe 
place as a useful fantasy. On the contrary, performance art can take us outside 
ourselves and bring us back to our real lives transformed.23 
 
 Participatory theater for conflict transformation has been used and evaluated 
by Search for Common Ground since 2005. The results have been shown to be 
promising and based on previous experiences SCG has organized transformational 
festivals bringing actors from the Great Lake Region to train them in participatory 
theater techniques. In 2007 a short video and a training manual were released in 
English and French to better assist artist peacebuilders in their work. In 2007 the SCG 
participatory theater won the Ashoka-Changemaker ‘‘Entrepreneuring Peace’’ Award 
for ‘‘On-the Ground Innovations for Managing Conflict,’’ selected from 158 entries 
from 42 countries.24 I will now evaluate one of their programs, which took place in 
DRC in 2011/2012 and used participatory theater to promote non-violent ways of 
conflict resolution.  
Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration through Information and Conflict 
Transformation – qualitative and quantitative evidence 
Program Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration through Information 
and Conflict Transformation was implemented in 2011/2012 by Search for Common 
Ground with support from the US Department of State’s Bureau of Population, 
Refugees and Migration. It targeted the communities in Burundi and DRC with the 
aim of successful repatriation and reintegration of refugees. One of the program’s 
main objectives was to “strengthen the conflict resolution capacities of local actors, 
                                                
23  Ibid., 31. 
24  Lena Slchamuijlder, "Setting the Stage for Peace: Participatory Theater for Conflict Transformation 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo," in Peace Movements Worldwide, eds. Michael N. Nagler and 
Marc Pilisuk, Vol. 3 (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2011), p. 229. 
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including returnees, residents, local authorities, and local administration” through 
participatory theater.25 The data for this analysis was drawn from a Final Evaluation 
Report of the program, which was based on a quantitative questionnaire as well as 
interviews with participants and staff members. The questionnaire was conducted 
with 401 people in DRC. Additionally, two focus groups were managed with 12 and 
16 participants respectively. In total 429 people were surveyed. I will only present the 
data concerning specifically DRC. 
The program targeted two territories in South Kivu province of DRC: Uvira 
and Fizi. It was designed to address community issues, which amounted to the largest 
number of disputes among local populations. The highest priority was assigned to 
land and property conflicts. Additionally, about 30% of survey participants mentioned 
family, ethnic and political disputes, particularly between the Bembe and the 
Banyamulenge, witchcraft and conflict because of unemployment. The region was 
chosen because of the significant numbers of returnees from Tanzania (82%), Burundi 
(12%), Rwanda (2%) and Kenya (2%). Figure 2.2 represents the respective ratio of 
residents to returnees among the survey participants.26  
 
Figure 2.2. DRC sample - residents and returnees. From: Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration 
through Information and Conflict Transformation: Final Evaluation Report (Washington: Search for 
Common Ground, [2012b]) 
                                                
25  Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration through Information and Conflict Transformation: 
Final Evaluation Report (Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground,[2012b]). 




In DRC 40% of the respondents had personal experience of land disputes. They often 
arise when the returnees come back to their land or their property after they had been 
forced to flee to neighboring countries because of the war. Upon returning they 
sometimes find that their home was demolished and the land taken over or sold in 
their absence. Issues such as jealousy, mistrust, rumors and stereotypes can aggravate 
the situation making the reintegration process more difficult. In addition, the 
resources and opportunities are scarce and the climate of mistrust can quickly escalate 
into violence. The state-sponsored mechanisms to address the conflicts are nearly 
absent, which leaves the perpetrators unpunished. In this environment the incentives 
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Figure 2.3: Most Common Types of Conflict. From: Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration through 





To address land disputes and other conflicts common in DRC, and promote 
the peaceful methods of conflict resolution among the communities SCG organized 
60 participatory theater performances. Additionally, 12 follow-up dialogue sessions 
were held, which “took the form of conflict resolution trainings as well as feedback 
and discussions around the theater performances.”28 There was a strong emphasis on 
dialogue as a means of finding sustainable solutions to problems.  
 The survey conducted among the study participants revealed that 86% of them 
felt that they were able to resolve the conflicts peacefully. In DRC the most common 
methods included negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution offered by local 
chiefs or traditional leaders. Among the study participants 54% were aware and took 
part in a participatory theater sessions. Theater was also mentioned among the most 
common sources of information about dispute resolution strategies. 94% of 
participants who attended the participatory theater session found them “excellent” or 
“good quality” and 95% found them inclusive of a diverse group of people including 
“ages genders and ethnic identities.”29 In DRC 92% found the session useful and 82% 
admitted that they have learned new mechanisms in which people can deal with 
disputes through peaceful means. Two main lessons-learned were: “who I can 
approach to resolve my problems”  (58%) and “various manners of handling the 
conflict non-violently” (53%).30  
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Figure 2.4: Common Dispute Resolution Strategies. From: Strengthening Repatriation and Reintegration 
through Information and Conflict Transformation: Final Evaluation Report (Washington: Search for 
Common Ground, [2012b]) 
 
There is also evidence that the communities have incorporated the new methods in 
their daily lives. 51% of the theater session’s participants said they had concretely put 
into practice what they had learned during the performances. Additionally, 95% felt 
that SCG has provided them with a “forum for open collaborative dialogue about 
conflict.” Some testimonies provide an interesting overview of what has been 
achieved, For example, some residents explained that after participating in theater 
performances they were willing to share the land with returnees.  
I knew that the land didn’t belong to me even though I had bought it legally. When I 
saw the theater performance, I felt really guilty. I remember it took place right after 
the mess on a Sunday. I saw the life that returnees live when they return home and I 
understood that I had to give up my land. So I gave it up to the returnee that owned it 
and I was surprised to see that he behaved in a good way the actors behaved in a 
theater.31 
 
In another testimony a participant tackles another common issue of family disputes. 
 
My father had two wives and many children. Before we were almost ready to kill 
each other because I refused to share the land. After the participatory theater session I 
went home and immediately called the other children to give them an equal share of 
the land.32 
 





The sessions have improved the knowledge about resorts to peaceful methods to 
resolve daily disputes. The quality of conflict mediation was enhanced and a higher 
level of understanding between the residents and returnees was reported.  
With the theatre we learned that we can help solve land conflicts between returnees 
and residents as a community.33  
 
The above evaluation leads to a conclusion that the participatory theater has 
the potential to help communities learn about peaceful methods of conflict resolution 
and helps to create meaningful bonds between community members. This kind of 
local peacebuilding empowers the people and gives them knowledge, which they can 
use and profit from. Combined with other methods of local peacebuilding such as 
radio and media, it can make a positive change in post-conflict societies.  
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Chapter 3: Yemen 
Conflict in Yemen 
 Yemen is located in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. As of 
2012 oil, which was discovered in Yemen in the 1960s, accounts for roughly 25% of 
GDP and 70% of government revenue.1 The country has been ethnically and 
politically divided for many years and subsequent wars and rebellions caused 
instability. The World Bank places Yemen among the poorest countries in the Arab 
world, with 55,4% of the population living in poverty in 2012. It is also one of the 
most food insecure countries globally.2 During the twentieth century Yemen 
transitioned from being a traditional society to a “melting pot of revolutions 
accompanied by foreign intervention.” 3 Although Yemen has been a battlefront 
between three major groups, namely, al Qaeda, the southern movement and the 
Houthis, for the purpose of this study I will focus on the conflict between the Houthis 
and the government, which best represents the underlying divisions along ethnic and 
religious lines. To understand the Houthi rebellion, which I will describe in detail, it is 
important to introduce a brief historical background, which places the conflict in a 
wider context. 
In the past, Yemen served as a crossroad for the civilizations in Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, East Africa and India. It was traditionally ruled by imams, sultans, 
kings and queens. The tribe has been the central socio-political unit and the 
cornerstone of the individual and shared identity. The number of tribes in Yemen is 
estimated between 74 and 100.4 Their leaders called “shaykhs” were traditionally 
                                                
1  Micheal Quentin Morton, "Oil Exploration in Yemen," Geo ExPro 10, no. 2 (2013) 70. 
2  World Bank, "Yemen Overview," http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview (accessed 
4/3, 2015). 
3  Uzi Rabi, Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015) XIV. 
4  Ibid., 7. 
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loyal to imams, who were both the political and the religious figures. Uzi Rabi 
explains, that “the Yemeni tribes, primarily the mountainous Zaydis, had always been 
the nucleus of the governing system and their loyalty was integral to the stability of 
every government.”5  
In the mid-nineteenth century Yemen was divided between the Ottoman 
Empire in the north and the British in the south. With the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire the Zaydi Imamate began to exert its control over the north of the country. 
Throughout this period, Yemen enjoyed relative stability and was administered 
according to tribal patterns. In 1962 the imamate did not withstand the pressures from 
outside and eventually collapsed due to revolutionary movements supported by Egypt. 
A new President, Sallal was appointed as a leader of Yemen Arab Republic, while 
Egyptian officials occupied prominent posts in the administration and military, 
effectively placing Yemen under Egyptian rule. A new republican order was 
introduced and many tribes grew dissatisfied with it. A long civil war erupted between 
“republicans” backed by Egypt and “royalists” backed by Saudi Arabia.6  
In the meantime, the British controlled South Yemen with its capital in Aden. 
Starting in 1962, the tribes felt that British rule was oppressive and demanded more 
freedoms and concessions that would allow the tribal leaders to exert more control. 
Years of struggle led to the end of British rule in 1967, and the creation of People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, the only declared Marxist regime in the Arab world. 
The year 1967 also marked the end of Egyptian rule in the Yemen Arab Republic. 
Sallal was deposed in a military coup, while the fighting between the royalists and the 
republicans continued. At this point, the region became a battlefront in the Cold War. 
The tensions between North and South Yemen never vanished; however some 
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attempts were made at reunification. They met with constant resistance from the 
Saudis and the tribal leaders of the north. Finally, the opportunity presented itself after 
the shifts in the international system, notably the fall of the Berlin wall, could no 
longer be ignored. In 1990, the “Sanaa Agreement” was signed by both states, which 
allowed for new a democratic government to be elected.  The united Republic of 
Yemen was created and the leader of North Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was 
appointed president.7  
 After the reunification Yemen went through yet another difficult period during 
the Gulf War in 1990-91. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Yemenis were 
presented with a dilemma. Their long-standing relations with Iraq were at stake if they 
supported the West. As a member of the UN Security Council at the time Yemen 
twice abstained from a vote which would impose sanctions on Iraq and ultimately 
voted against the use of force to recapture Kuwait, instead advocating an Arab 
solution to the conflict.8 Western powers and Saudi Arabia interpreted the vote as a 
betrayal. The US cut off its aid to Yemen, while Saudi Arabia deployed troops along 
the border. Additionally, Saudis expelled all Yemeni workers. 750,000 people 
returned home leaving everything behind. A long period of hostility was marked by 
border disputes and Saudi meddling in Yemeni politics. In 1994 a civil war erupted 
between the north and south. Eventually, the north imposed unity but tensions 
exacerbated as the Saudis continuously supported southern separatists.  
The beginning of twentieth century, still under the presidency of Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, Yemen was marked by a declining economy, and the strengthening of Islamist 
and secessionist movements in the South. The difficult relationship between society 
                                                
7  Ibid., 118. 




and the government reflected years of ethnic, geographic and political divides. Saleh 
used the tribal divisions as an ”alternative to a party system.”9  
This was seen especially during the years 1990-1994. The regime did not confiscate 
the tribes’ weapons and used the tribal heads as mediators between the regime and 
rival groups. But when the civil war was over, it became clear that armed tribes and 
their leaders posed a real threat to the state in certain areas.[…] The tribes did not 
offer an alternative to Salih’s rule but created an additional power center that had to 
bargained with, the very existence of armed tribal enclaves was a persistent source of 
instability. 10  
	  
Tribal tensions became one of the major problems Yemen was facing. The Houthi 
rebellion, although being motivated by diverging religious beliefs and tribal 
ancestries, emerged in the province of Sa’da as a manifestation of discontent of local 
populations with government policies.  
From 2004 on the Yemeni government was presented with a threat of a civil 
war, which still looms over the country today. The Zayidi rebels – popularly known as 
the Houthis became active in the far north of the country, adjacent to the Saudi 
border. In 2004, the Zayidi cleric Husayn Badr al’Din al’Huthi started to openly 
criticize the government of Yemen. The conflict had its roots in the marginalization of 
the northern province of Sa’da in terms of infrastructure, social welfare, education and 
security. The Zayidi tribes began to identify these issues and saw their shared interest. 
Additionally, they were able to reach common ground based on their shared religious 
affiliation Shiites.11 The development of the Young Believers movement under the 
leadership of al-Huthi marked a step forward towards this unification. Over the years 
al-Huthi established schools and preached theories seen by some as intolerant and 
against the Zayidi tradition of moderate Islam. However, Al-Huthi was eventually 
able to gather around him a large group of supporters among the Zayidi tribal groups, 
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11  Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen : 
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who endorsed his criticism of the government and its policies of siding with the West, 
in particular with the United States. In return, the Yemeni government saw a great 
danger in the growing movement and decided to send soldiers to the northern 
provinces, which were traditionally quite autonomous.  
The conflict erupted in September 2004, when the “young believers” captured 
the mosques and acted violently. The government decided to suppress the revolt.  800 
were killed, including 400 soldiers and Husayn al-Huthi, who became the martyr of 
the new rebellion.12 
The fighting resumed in 2005, when the Houthis conducted a series of attacks 
against the state institutions, this time spreading also to the Sanaa province. The 
violence triggered a regional response with Iran accusing the government of Yemen 
of trying to eliminate the Shiite community. In 2006, both parties reached a ceasefire 
agreement. Efforts by the government to appease the Houthis included overall pardon 
and release of prisoners and compensation. Additionally, the security forces were 
willing to cooperate with any actors that would join the fight against the Shiite rebels, 
including the Sunni. In the latter stage, this step deepened the religious divides 
between groups, leading Yemen towards Sunni-Shiite conflict, which at the time of 
writing, seems to be escalating into a regional proxy war.13  
In 2007 the Houthis started to target the Jewish communities. The government 
tried to appease both parties and offered alternative housing to the Jews who felt 
threated by the “young believers.” The issue was never resolved and the communities 
remained fragile throughout the conflict.  That same year Iran became more vocal 
about the developments in Yemen. Protests erupted in the streets of Tehran calling for 
the expulsion of the Yemeni ambassador. Since then Iran has been accused of 
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providing weapons to the rebels. Meanwhile, on the ground the government 
intensified its activities against the Houthis in the Sa’da province in order to regain 
control over the territories. Yemeni forces shelled villages where the rebels were 
believed to be hiding. Finally, mediation efforts by Qatar ended the fighting for a few 













Year 2008 was marked by a series of clashes between the Houthis and the 
Yemeni army. An attempted ceasefire did not last and the agreements, including 
disarmament, withdrawal of the army and expulsion of rebel leaders, were not 
respected. Additionally, the Houthis banned 3,200 students and 91 teachers from 
attending schools in Sa’da province. That same year, the rebels assassinated a member 
of the Presidential Committee, Al-Hindi, and exploded a bomb in Bin Salman 
Mosque, which further worsened the fragile situation. The Houthis became more 
extreme in their messages: “death to America, death to Israel, victory for Islam.”  
From Phases to Rolling Conflict    133
Time Line and Geographic Migration of the Conflict
F gure 5.1 dep cts a time line of t con!ict. Although it has been divided by analysts
and government o"cials into six discrete phases, the Sa‘da wars are best characterized 
as a “rolling” con!ict, with spikes occurring during times of increased GoY retaliation 
for Huthi ambushes and skirmishes. Indeed, the GoY, not the Huthis, has announced 
each phase of the war. Each phase, however, does appear to have a “spark” that ignited 
the ensuing escalation of armed con!ict. #ese sparks have be n uniformly disputed 
by protagonists in the con!ict and likely fail to accurately pinpoint the true reason for 
each successive phase. Such disputation further highlights the polarizing and ambigu-
ous nature of the con!ict itself. Below, we explore the contours of each phase. For each, 
we provide statistics, signi$cant locations, and a summary.6
Figure 5.1




















































June 2004: GoY convoy arrives in Sa‘da to arrest
or kill Husayn al-Huthi; armed conflict ensues 
September 2004: GoY announces





December 2005: Fighting ensues after
clashes in al-Khafji and Suq al-Talh
February 2006: Fighting dies
down after a new Sa‘da governor
is appointed
February 2007: Fighting begins
after the Huthi disarmament
deadline expires
August 11, 2009: High Security
Council declares it will crush
rebellion with an “iron fist”
July 2008: GoY unilaterally
declares the end of hostilities 
May 2008: Fighting ensues after
a bomb is detonated outside of
bin Salman mosque in Sa‘da city 







having been signed 
6 Our timing of the beginning and end of con!ict phases follows the approaches found in other studies, with 
the exception of Phases 3 and 4. #ough recognizing these periods of con!ict as “wars,” the GoY and Huthis have 
not indicated what they consider to be their beginning and end points. Our timing—which di%ers from Human 
Rights Watch’s “Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests in the Armed Con!ict with Huthi Rebels in Yemen” 
(Report 1-56432-392-7, October 2008), for example—is based on the kinetic incident tracking method applied 
to the con!ict as a whole, for which we used al-Ayyam and corroborating sources known to follow the $ghting on 
a daily or near-daily basis (see note below). For Phases 3 and 4, when we found that the frequency and magnitude 
of con!icts had reached those reminiscent of previous and subsequent phases of recognized “war,” we judged that 
the transition from interim phase to “war” phase had occurred.
Figure 3.1. Time Line of Sa'da Wars. From: Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt and Madelaine Wells, 




In 2009 they were able to take over a few buildings, institutions and the 
central market in the province of Ghamar. The assassinations of government officials 
and shayks from pro-government tribes continued.14 Efforts at mediation appeared 
difficult and Saleh’s government was facing two other threats: the resurgence of al 
Qaeda and the southern movement. Ending the Houthi issue became one of the 
priorities and in August 2009 the army began another offensive in Sa’da region. In an 
unprecedented way, Saudi Arabia also launched strikes on the Houthis, including air 
assets, artillery and ground forces.15 In response, the rebels crossed the border killing 
two guards, which gave the Saudis an incentive to continue, citing the excuse that 
Houthis infiltrated their territory. This phase of fighting ended in 2010 when both 
sides signed a ceasefire agreement, which stipulated the withdrawal of rebels from 
Saudi Arabia and the end of hostilities by all parties.  
Various groups within the country, including the Houthis, al Qaeda and the 
southern movement, have been fighting each other and the government for a long 
time. In January 2011 the Arab Spring swept through the country, making the state 
even more fragile. Thousands of people took to the streets of Sanaa and demanded 
that President Ali Abdullah Saleh steps down. The protesters were met with riot 
police using tear gas and batons. In the latter stage, violent means of appeasement 
followed and on March 18, 2011 the army fired at 100,000 people gathered in Sanaa. 
52 protesters were killed and many more wounded. The government denied 
responsibility. Some officials used the opportunity to show their hostility towards 
Saleh and defected to the opposition. Among them was Ali Mushin al-Ahmar, who 
dispatched forces in the capital to protect the protesters in response to government’s 
actions. The region of Sa’da was previously controlled by the tribal militias of al-
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Ahmar, which now directed their efforts elsewhere. The Houthis seized this 
opportunity to take control of the province of Sa’da by installing their own governor. 
Since then they have been growing in power and advancing to the south.16 
 Although various international efforts followed to establish a rule of law, 
rebuild institutions and unify the country, at the time of writing the Houthis had taken 
over the capital and the port of Aden, forcing president Hadi into hiding. They also 
took actions to dissolve parliament and take over Yemen’s government institutions. I 
will now analyze the international efforts aimed at conflict resolution and 
reconstruction in Yemen, which focus mainly on the period following the 2010 
ceasefire agreement between the Houthis and the government. 
Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction Efforts in Yemen 
 The response of the international community to the crisis in Yemen does not 
seem to follow any coordinated strategy. Instead, various actors, including states, 
coalitions of states, IOs and NGOs work on many fronts and tackle different issues. 
Efforts have been centered around few a major problems, including: countering global 
terrorism networks such as al Qaeda, suppressing national insurgencies, designing and 
implementing a comprehensive security sector reform and alleviating poverty. 
Although some programs were directed at the local population, most of them took the 
top-down coercive approach.  
 First, I will analyze the regional response to the Yemeni conflict between the 
government and the Houthi rebels. Saudi Arabia played the most important role here, 
as it was the only state which intervened military to support the Yemeni security 
forces. Already during the Cold War, Saudi Arabia was constantly meddling in the 
politics of North Yemen. Keeping the tribal conflicts alive and preventing the 
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unification of North and South Yemen was one of the main goals of this neighboring 
power. Saudis not only saw a danger in having a strong oil producing country next 
door. The issue revolved also around ideology. It was problematic to have a 
republican state which espoused democratization right across the border. The stability 
of the monarchy could be upset if similar pressure towards a multi-party system 
would arise among the Saudis.17 During the last phase of fighting between the Houthis 
and the government the Saudis launched strikes by air and land to fight the rebels who 
they saw as a threat to their territorial integrity. It is important to note that the Houthis 
have not been the only target of Yemen’s northern neighbor. Saudi Arabia in coalition 
with the United States has been actively fighting al Qaeda in the region since its 
Yemeni counterpart joined forces with the Saudi branch in 2009. Constant drone 
attacks by the coalition have sparked protests among the local population, who often 
suffered as a result of this war on terror.  
 Further efforts to establish peace in Yemen were made in 2011 when the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, initiated the negotiations towards a peaceful 
transition of power in Yemen. The government and all opposition parties participated. 
The solutions proposed by the Gulf Initiative included: 1) the transfer of power to the 
Vice-President of Yemen, Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi, 2) the creation of a governmental 
coalition, 3) the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections within two 
months after the signing of a deal and 4) granting immunity from prosecution to the 
president and his relatives.18 Finally in November 2011 Saleh signed the deal and four 
months later Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi was elected President. A National Dialogue 
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Conference followed as an attempt to bring the warring parties to the negotiating 
table. 
The recent opaque political transposition has left Yemen’s new president Abd Rabbu 
Mansur Hadi – also Saleh’s former deputy since 1994 – grappling with military 
restructuring, in an attempt to at least weaken if not break old embedded allegiances 
and, through the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), confronting the long-standing 
issues of southern discontent and calls for secession, as well as the increasingly 
prolific northern-rebel movement of the Shia-Muslim Houthis calling for autonomy.19 
 
The European Union became the major contributor to efforts towards Security 
Sector Reform (SSR). Following the needs assessment mission in 2012, the EU took 
steps to facilitate progress in developing the security sector. In July 2012 the EU 
deployed an SSR expert team, financed by the Instrument for Stability. The experts 
worked closely with the Yemeni government to elaborate a comprehensive SSR plan. 
Additionally, the EU was planning to support the Yemeni maritime sector through 
training.20  
Finally, some efforts by international IO’s and NGO’s focused on alleviating 
poverty. These were sometimes coordinated and implemented with the help of the 
Yemeni government. The World Bank’s support included efforts to “create visible 
improvements that are meaningful in the daily life of Yemenis, such as providing 
funds for schools and health clinics and expanding support for public works, basic 
education, health and water supply.”21 Additionally the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has been at the forefront of the post-crisis agenda in Yemen. In 
2012, with the financial support of international donors, the UNDP set up a program 
aimed at improving democratic governance, alleviating poverty and facilitating crisis 
prevention and recovery. Some of the efforts included strengthening civil society 
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institutions, such as NGOs and grassroots organizations, which could be used as 
partners in humanitarian assistance and as providers of basic needs to the population. 
Security sector reform and fighting corruption were some of the strategies used to 
prevent future conflict. Additionally, a voter education campaign was launched and 
“240 tons of fertilizer and 120 tons of seeds” were disbursed among the poorest in the 
Sa’sa province in line with the “early recovery” project in the region.22 
In sum, the international community’s approach to conflict resolution and 
reconstruction in Yemen was mainly based on a top-down approach. Direct military 
interventions and negotiations with elites were advocated with a few initiatives 
directed at the local populations. The efforts by UNDP and the World Bank mainly 
focused on humanitarian assistance and poverty alleviation. Their contribution to 
helping the communities was significant because it tackled some of the issues which 
in a long term could lead to more conflict over scarce resources. A few NGO’s 
focused their efforts on national reconciliation. In the following chapter I will 
evaluate one such program implemented by Search for Common Ground. 
Episodic Drama in Yemen – Search for Common Ground 
 The Team is a multi-nation episodic drama, which has used the global 
fascination with football/soccer to attempt to change behaviors and ultimately 
responses to conflict in countries torn by violence. The series addresses the disputes 
revolving around existing cultural, ethnic, religious, tribal, racial or socio-economic 
differences and uses sport as a means to unify communities. To better appeal to the 
public and make sure that the content is authentic, Search for Common Ground (SCG) 
draws actors and scriptwriters from the local communities who often experienced 
conflict first hand. By collaborating with local production companies it uses local 
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knowledge and expertise to better reflect the realities on the ground. The series has 
now been reproduced in 15 countries and includes different geographical regions 
including Africa, Middle East and Asia.  
 Production of The Team in Yemen was funded by the European Commission 
and the Dutch Embassy in Sana’a. SCG partnered with six local contractors including 
a TV and some radio production companies. Actors and scriptwriters were drawn 
from the local population.  
The show consisted of 25 TV episodes and was launched together with 120 
radio episodes aimed at communicating “positive social messages through 
fictionalized stories of a diverse group of Yemeni youth playing football, although 
less than 10% of the show contained actual football-related imagery and story line.” 23 
For the purpose of this study I will only focus on the episodic drama, which was 
broadcast on the national TV channel accompanied by an outreach and dialogue 
campaign implemented in 10 governorates where 600 viewing/listening sessions were 
held followed by debates among youth, universities, local councils and NGOs, for a 
total 30,000 participants. Additionally, 60 mobile cinema screenings were held in 
public spaces to attract a larger and more diverse public. One of the goals was to work 
on both national and local levels. Specifically, the viewing/listening sessions and 
mobile cinema aimed at encouraging debates following the screenings to build 
capacity among participants to interact in more tolerant and informed way. 
Addressing ethnic, religious and political issues was at the core of the discussions as 
well as promotion of peaceful methods to resolve daily disputes.24  
As an art form drama is in a way similar to participatory theater. Although it 
does not involve a direct contact between the actors and the public, it retains its ability 
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to tell stories, which reflect the daily problems facing post-conflict societies. The 
rationale behind why it could possibly help people change their responses to daily 
disputes functions similarly to participatory theater. To avoid repetition, I will provide 
a theoretical background provided by SCG in order to better explain why drama could 
add to peacebuilding efforts.  
Among the theories of social change for peacebuilding, the Public Attitude 
Theory is the basis of SCG approach.  
[…] peace can be promoted through changing public attitudes and building greater 
tolerance in society. The method of doing so involves the use of TV and radio 
programs which promote tolerance, dialogue and mutual understanding. “The Team” 
is firmly founded in this change theory […].25  
Individual Change Theory also adds to this discourse. It states that if a critical mass of 
individuals achieves a change of consciousness manifesting in a change of attitudes 
and behaviors, peace can come about as a result of this transformation. By promoting 
the messages of positive behavior there is a potential that drama could influence 
people’s perception and attitude towards conflict. Finally, Healthy Relations and 
Connections Theory states that peace can be achieved “through a continuous process 
of breaking down isolation, polarization, division, prejudice and stereotypes between 
or among groups.” The Team not only promotes tolerance, but also builds healthy 
relations on a local level by encouraging peaceful dialogue as a solution to daily 
disputes.  
The Team -  quantitative and qualitative evidence 
I will now present the findings of the Final Evaluation Report of “The Team” 
to see if this particular program was effective in promoting the resort to non-violent 
means of resolving conflicts. The program was launched in 2010, however it was not 
implemented until 2012 because of technical issues as well as political instability in 
Yemen. The evaluation relied on mixed methodology employing both quantitative 
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and qualitative research. It was conducted in 5 governorates: Sana’a, Taiz, Aden, 
Hajjah and Al Bayda which were chosen to achieve balance between rural and urban 
location in both north and south Yemen. Data regarding the exact number of 
participants in the survey was not provided.  
According to a quantitative survey, The Team was fairly effective at 
promoting the intended messages. However, no impact was found on attitudes and 




Figure 3.2. Impact of the Show. From: Rani Khoury, Final Evaluation of "The Team" (Washington, DC: 
Search for Common Ground, [2013]) 
 
Although the general findings showed that the program had a limited effect, the 
results varied across the governorates. It was also evident that the participants who did 
attend the viewing sessions and the discussions that followed understood the message 
behind the show better than those who only watched the show on TV. Moreover, they 
were able to put what they have learned into practice in their daily lives. Statements 
by those survey participants indicated that they were better equipped to respond in 
non-violent ways during disputes and were able to control themselves choosing 
 
 52 
dialogue instead of violence. For example, a participant in Sana’a stated that after 
being exposed to the show, he would think twice before resorting to violence, 
indicating that his approach to conflict resolution had changed. He was however one 
of the few who mentioned that their behaviors changed under the influence of the 
show. 80.3% responded that they have not done anything differently in their lives 
after watching The Team.26  
 
 
Figure 3.3. TV - Clarity of Storyline and Characters. From: Rani Khoury, Final Evaluation of "The Team" 
(Washington DC: Search for Common Ground, [2013]) 
 
The diagrams (Figure 3.3 and 3.4) indicate that the messages behind the show 
were understood. Among different choices provided to them during the survey (Figure 
3.4), the majority of the participants answered that “violence versus dialogue” was the 
main massage of the show. The second most commonly chosen topic was “women’s 
roles in Yemen” followed by “tension between different tribal groups.” Again, the 
answers varied across the governorates. Additionally, although the messages behind 
the show were comprehended, no major impact was found on the social views. 
According to quantitative surveys those participants who were not exposed to the 
program did not seem to have significantly different social views than those who 
followed the show on TV or at the viewing/listening sessions (Annex I). The 
                                                
26  Ibid. 
 
 53 
difference between those two groups was only in the degree of tolerance with the 
latter group having a more tolerant social view. 27 
 
 
The results of the focus group discussions and interviews conducted in Sana’a 
province indicated that participants there got the most out of the show, best 
understood the messages and showed their applicability. Some stated that the 
messages were familiar to them and therefore the show was too simple. Participants in 
Haji also had a good understanding of the content but they were able to cite fewer 
examples. In Taiz and Al Bayda only a few respondents could fully remember what 
they have seen during the show. In Aden, participants were neither able to recall the 
content of the episodes nor cite any examples of behaviours they were exposed to. 
Additionally, they refused to participate in the debate following one of the listening 
sessions, stating that the accent of the radio episodes was from Sana’a. This shows 
that the divisions between north (Sana’a) and south (Aden) are still present in the 
minds of people, who felt that they had been rejected because of an accent presented 
in the radio episodes.  
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Figure 3.4. Main Message of the TV Show. From: Rani Khoury, Final Ealuation of "The Team" (Washington, DC: 
Search for Common Ground, [2013]) 
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The report indicated that the viewing sessions followed by a debate had the 
biggest impact on the participants and were “very effective at promoting dialogue and 
discussion among youth on issues of tolerance and understanding.”28 People who 
attended the screenings explained that the discussion that followed helped them to 
gather different opinions and ultimately find a common understanding or conclusion.  
Most participants in all governorates except Taiz were able to provide examples of 
discussions that have led to a common understanding; such as a discussion on the role 
of the character “Arwa” as the team coach. While they had persistently diverging 
opinions on the role of women in such positions, they reached an understanding that 
regardless of her suitability as a coach, the decision came from the team members 
themselves and that by itself it should be respected and accepted.29 
  
Another observation was that the group that participated in discussions, especially in 
Sana’a, displayed better debating skills and held more civil discussions. They would 
not interrupt each other and work together to find a common understanding of issues 
at hand. Additionally, some participants indicated that the show and the debate gave 
them the tools to transfer into their own initiatives. For example, a person from Sana’a 
said that she used the story of “Arwa” to communicate the message of women 
empowerment to members of the organization she was part of. Other participants 
showed a willingness to share materials distributed during debates (DVDs and 
discussion guide) within their workplace, civil society organizations or at home.30  
 In sum, the program The Team had a limited impact on the population who 
watched it on TV or participated in the screenings. However, the results varied and 
the overall results show that local efforts in showcasing the drama combined with 
dialogue sessions were more effective in not only spreading the message behind the 
show but also in encouraging the participants to address their differences through 
discussion. The weaknesses of the current approach included limited outreach via TV 
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channels, inexperience of staff in media and insufficient marketing and advertising 
activities. Many participants reported that they were not aware that the show was 
broadcast on TV and via which channels.31 Given, that it was a first attempt to spread 
these messages across the Yemenis and little time passed between the program’s end 
and the conduct of the evaluation, there is a chance that with time, the show will reach 
a wider population and have more impact on behaviours and attitudes.   
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Annex 3.1.1. – Quantitative Data (Social Views) 








   
 
Chapter 4: Nepal 
Conflict in Nepal 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal is a landlocked country, situated in 
South Asia and bordering India and China. It is listed among the poorest countries in 
the world and for the past two decades it has been characterized by political 
instability. Since the introduction of democracy in 1990 Nepal has had over 20 
governments and following the demands of Maoist rebels, it has abolished the 
monarchy and declared itself a federal republic.1 From 1996 till 2006 it was torn by a 
civil war, which took the lives of an estimated 13,000 people and left 200,000 
displaced.2 I will now introduce the history of Nepal’s civil war and see how it was 
resolved and what reconstruction measures were undertaken.  
The conflict, which so fiercely divided the Nepalese society, had its roots deep 
in the past. Nepal was a monarchy throughout most of its history. It was ruled by two 
major dynasties: the Shahs and the Ranas. In 1768 the Shahs conquered and united the 
small territories of the Kathmandu Valley. They introduced a new government, which 
“institutionalized two divisive social systems: feudal bureaucracy and the Hindu caste 
system.”3 For over two hundred years this ancient way based on “divide and rule” 
deepened the inequalities between the ethnic groups and the castes. In fact, land, 
power and wealth were concentrated in the hands of a few high castes, who had ties to 
royal family. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates made a through study of the legacy 
of this system and how it contributed to the insurgency of the Maoist movement in 
1990s. For example, the upper castes: Bahun, Chetri and Newar constituted 37.1% of 
                                                
1  Nepal Overview, The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nepal/overview#1. 
(accessed 4/20/2015) 
2  Judith Pettigrew and David N. Gellner, Maoists at the Hearth: Everyday Life in Nepal's Civil War 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 16. 
3  Prakash Adhikari and Steven Samford, "The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist 
Insurgency," Studies in Comparative International Development 48, no. 4 (12, 2013), p. 462. 
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the population in 1991, however their human development indicators were about 50% 
higher than other groups, such as the hill ethnic or Tharai ethnic groups. This same 
principle was evident when looking at per capita income: hill ethnic groups were 
making around 55% of an average Newari’s salary. Additionally, the upper castes 
occupied the majority of senior positions in the government and represented 87% of 
all graduates in the year 1992.4 Lack of employment, marginalization and 
landlessness were some of the most urgent issues for the majority of the Nepalese 
people. The bonded labor system presented yet another relic, which forced many into 
compulsory unpaid labor services in order to pay their debt stemming from the fact 
that they did not own any land. The cycle of poverty was perpetuated and there was 
plenty of space for abuses of power among the higher and literate castes.5  
In 1990, the political liberalization opened a new chapter in the history of 
Nepal. Following a long period of demonstrations in all major cities organized by the 
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, and amid the mounting pressure by the 
ruling elites, the king capitulated.6 The organization of political parties was allowed 
and elections were held a year later. Although the country was shifting towards 
democracy, very little was done to address the systemic inequalities. The creation of 
the Maoist party was a direct response and reflected the demands of the marginalized 
ethnic and religious minorities. The new constitution proclaimed Nepal a Hindu state 
and recognized only Nepalese as the official language. However, there were around 
100 different castes and ethnic groups in Nepal, speaking over 90 languages. Their 
rights and claims were overlooked by the new constitution. Most political parties were 
satisfied with the new arrangement as it put an end to autocratic rule. However, the 
                                                
4  Scott Gates and S. Mansoob Murshed, "Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal," Review of Development Economics 9, no. 1 (2005), p. 126-127. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Judith Pettigrew and David N. Gellner, Maoists at the Hearth: Everyday Life in Nepal's Civil War 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 11. 
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Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) did not follow suit seeing the constitution as a 
“betrayal of public demand for a people’s constitution.”7 The Maoists had a political 
and revolutionary wing. The former, United People’s Front of Nepal, ran for elections 
in 1991 but was able to secure only nine seats out of 205, still making it the third 
largest party in the government. The revolutionary wing (Unity Center) started to 
organize to bring about a revolution.8 
The Maoist strategy was simple and quite successful. They started to recruit 
among the most vulnerable: those affected by caste, ethnic and economic exclusion. 
They attracted the interest of the people by developing a “list of demands,” which 
resonated with grievances of the disadvantaged populations.  
The CPN (M) developed a list of demands that appealed explicitly to the experience 
of marginalized caste and ethnic groups and the impoverished, including the demands 
such as the abolition of caste-, religion- and gender-based discrimination, the 
elimination of socio-economic inequalities and redistribution of land. […] Appealing 
specifically to these marginalized groups, the CPN (M) demanded that Nepal be 
declared a secular state, that the system of “untouchability” be declared nullified, that 
equal status be accorded to all languages spoken in the country and that education in 
one’s mother tongue be accommodated through the secondary level of education.9 
 
 The Maoists also advocated the abolishment of the monarchy and the establishment 
of the federal states. In their view this would grant some autonomy to regions with 
large ethnic concentrations based on the principle of self-determination. The 
economic inequalities between the various districts were stark. Specifically the 
western regions of the country were historically underdeveloped and were inhabited 
by over 20 different ethnic groups. Based on this knowledge the Maoists chose the 
western districts as “the key region for the People’s War.”10 During the electoral 
                                                
7  Prakash Adhikari and Steven Samford, The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist Insurgency, 
Vol. 48 (Springer Science & Business Media B.V, 2013), p. 463. 
8  Judith Pettigrew and David N. Gellner, Maoists at the Hearth: Everyday Life in Nepal's Civil War 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 13. 
9  Prakash Adhikari and Steven Samford, The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist Insurgency, 
Vol. 48 (Springer Science & Business Media B.V, 2013), p. 463-464. 
10  Ibid. 
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campaign they laid the ground for insurgency by educating people about their goals 
and advocating the armed struggle as the only way to freedom from oppression.  
 The revolution started as a small insurgency in 1996 in the western districts of 
Nepal. In February the Maoists attacked a branch of a national bank and stormed the 
police posts. The government responded by launching three subsequent operations by 
the police forces. They gradually became more violent and used tactics such as 
arbitrary arrests, torture and rape to intimidate local villagers. Operation Kilo Sierra II 
“was conducted with such blunt force and disregard for human rights that it only 
strengthened the rebels’ recruitment base.”11 In 2001 the insurgency took a more 
violent stance and spread across the entire country, effectively limiting the 
government’s presence to the districts’ headquarters. The Maoists also started 
establishing their own “People’s Governments” as an alternative form of 
administration. The peace talks conducted in 2001 between the rebels and the 
government proved futile and King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency. The 
decision was followed by increased efforts by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) to 
crack down on the insurgents. State-led violence terrorized local populations and 
became widespread while more people with different ethnic, caste and economic 
backgrounds were joining the Maoist movement.12 
 The second phase of the civil war started in 2001 and lasted until 2006. It was 
characterized by increased levels of violence by the state actors. King Gyanendra 
additionally suspended freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. The media was no 
longer able to publish uncensored information. In 2002 the king dissolved the 
Parliament and appointed the cabinet members. The elections were postponed 
                                                
11  Arjun Karki and David Seddon, The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives (New Delhi: Adroit 
Publishers, 2003), p. 24. 
12  Prakash Adhikari and Steven Samford, The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist 
Insurgency, Vol. 48 (Springer Science & Business Media B.V, 2013), p. 466. 
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indefinitely providing an incentive to fight for those who believed in a shift towards 
democracy.13  The CPN (Maoist) was declared a “terrorist organization” and the army 
was granted extensive powers to fight the terrorists. In 2003 the second cease-fire was 
negotiated between the rebels and the king’s appointees. The leaders of the 
insurgency did not trust the negotiators and vice versa. Finally, the talks collapsed due 
to lack of progress on the issue of a Constituent Assembly. The Maoists also 
demanded a new constitution, where the role of the king would be redefined, 
something the government did not approve of.  
 The fighting resumed and both the Maoists and the RNA committed human 
rights abuses. Widespread use of torture, cases of long-term incommunicado 
detention, disappearances and use of approximately 4,500 child soldiers were some of 
the consequences of the war. As the atrocities continued, more people grew 
dissatisfied with the oppressive regime and in 2005 strikes and protests against the 
royal family increased. Finally in 2006 the People’s Movement (Jan Andolan) was 
created, comprising various political parties and civil organizations. The Maoists 
participated in the movement but did not officially align with it. In April 2006 the 
King stepped down and one month later the Maoists signed a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement with the government. The agreement marked an official end to the 
insurgency by meeting some of the demands such as “plans for election of the 
Constituent Assembly and monitoring and soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) by the United Nations.14 
After the war ended the Maoists secured the largest number of seats in the new 
Parliament and in 2008 they voted to end the monarchy. The country became the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and Ram Baran Yadav was elected the first 
                                                
13  Ibid.  
14  Judith Pettigrew and David N. Gellner, Maoists at the Hearth: Everyday Life in Nepal's Civil War 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 15. 
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President. Since then Nepal has been politically unstable, going through a number of 
deadlocks due to disagreements between the ruling parties. At the time of writing the 
new constitution is still being drafted and disagreements loom over the carving of 
provinces. The Maoists, who secured only a small faction of seats in the Parliament 
during the 2013 elections, asked that the provinces be shaped along the ethnic lines, a 
solution which the governing majority opposes.15 
Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction Efforts in Nepal 
 Nepal is an interesting case study when it comes to international involvement 
during the post-conflict period. A combination of national pride, regional politics and 
internal opposition to the international presence, forced the country to deal with the 
peace process mostly on its own and with quite successful results, despite a few 
failures.  
 The United Nations’ involvement in Nepal started in 2003, when it offered its 
good offices to conduct the peace talks. It was only invited to participate in the 
process in 2004. From early on Nepalese insisted that their fate was in their own 
hands and tried to keep the international actors out of their business. This was evident 
during the 2006 demonstrations organized by political parties and civil society. After 
the Comprehensive Peace agreement was signed, the country emerged from a conflict 
which deeply divided the society along the ethnic, religious and political lines. There 
was a high level of mistrust between the Maoists and the government, who both had 
substantial armies under their command. The peace agreement did not include the 
disarmament of any faction until the elections, which were to be held in 2008. This 
arrangement could easily lead to an escalation of violence during this fragile period.16  
                                                
15  Bhadra Sharma, "Brawl Disrupt Drafting of Constitution in Nepal," The New York Times 
(1/20/2015, 2015), accessed 4/23/2015. 
16  Astri Suhrke, "Virtues of a Narrow Mission: The UN Peace Operation in Nepal," Global 
Governance 17, no. 1 (Jan, 2011), p. 38-89. 
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At the United Nations debates were held to create a full-scale peacekeeping 
operation to monitor the ceasefire. India initially opposed the idea based on its own 
experiences in Kashmir and also because it considered Nepal its backyard and did not 
want foreign intervention. However, as it became clear that the Maoists would not 
give up weapons before the election period, India pushed for the UN monitoring 
presence. On the other hand, the forces within Nepal were clearly against international 
peacekeepers on their soil. An element of national pride and a sense of national 
ownership of the peace process were the main reasons behind this approach. After 
intense negotiations, the Nepalese parties to the peace agreement consented to a small 
monitoring UN presence, which would be comprised only of civilian personnel. 
Finally, the unprecedented United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMID) was deployed 
comprised of 250 civilians along with UN Human Rights Field Mission in Nepal.  
The rationale behind such a small mission came from the fact that unlike most 
states where the UN had a peacekeeping presence, Nepal was not a failed state. The 
police and army forces were still functional and could be relied upon. Although there 
was no guarantee that the violence would not return, there was a political will among 
the warring factions to end the conflict. The mission’s mandate was limited compared 
to previous experiences with peacebuilding.  
As mandated by the Security Council (Resolution 1740/2007) with reference to the 
CPA, UNMIN had three main functions: (1) to monitor the cantonment of the Maoist 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Nepal Army and their arms; (2) to monitor 
the cease-fire; and (3) to assist with the election to the Constituent Assembly. This 
was a far cry from the typical multidimensional mission being deployed for 
peacebuilding…17 
  
Arms monitoring was conducted in all major PLA and NPA army camps. 
Weapon depots were under electronic surveillance. The Joint Monitoring and 
Coordination Committee was set up to deter cheating and to resolve disputes. An 
                                                
17  Ibid. 
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Arms Monitoring Office deployed patrolling units, where soldiers from both armies 
and international observers were involved in field monitoring. Although limited, the 
presence of a third party kept the casualties at a low level. Reports that followed were 
generally positive about the peace processes.  
The UNMIN’s electoral support was confined to technical assistance and 
monitoring. An Independent Electoral Assistance Office was also set up but it was 
very small. Again, the UN presence was mainly as a third party observer. The special 
Representative of the Secretary–General (SRSG) additionally served as a “watchdog” 
and provided reports about the implementation of the peace agreements.18  
Although limited in scope, the UN’s performance during the post-conflict 
peacebuilding in Nepal could be described as a success story. Whether the minimal 
involvement of international actors actually contributed to this favorable outcome 
remains to be seen. It seems clear however, that the sense of national ownership 
created a sense of responsibility among the Nepalese and in that sense maybe sped up 
the process of conflict resolution.  
The reconstruction efforts were also mainly performed by the local actors. The 
international donors had a long experience with Nepalese institutions and a sense of 
confidence developed in the state’s capacity to handle funds. Not all regions were 
equally affected by war and on a larger scale, the conflict in Nepal was seen by the 
UN as a “small war” compared to other zones in the world.19 The financial assistance 
for reconstruction was mainly distributed through the United Nations Development 
Programme, which focused on a few major themes: 1) reducing poverty and 
promoting sustainable development, 2) strengthening democratic governance, 3) 
building resilience, 4) supporting Nepal’s democratic transition, and 5) promoting 
                                                
18  Ibid. 
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gender equality and social inclusion. Approximately 13 billion US$ were spent on 
post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation up until year 2013.20 
To prevent future conflicts, the UNDP founded a few initiatives and supported 
local organizations in their work with affected communities. A Conflict Prevention 
Programme was set up and focused on “building collaborative leadership and 
dialogue skills” among politicians and youth leaders.21 Through a series of 
conferences and dialogue fora, and with a media presence encouraged, the programme 
facilitated national discussion among the elites about the future of Nepal and current 
issues regarding the constitution process. Grassroots peacebuilding was addressed on 
a very low level and mainly through support of already existing civil society 
organizations such as Women’s Security Pressure Group, Electoral Commission of 
Nepal’s Gender and Social Inclusion or Being LGBT in Asia initiative.22 Although 
women occupy 37% of posts in the government, as civil society and political leaders, 
this success can be mainly attributed to the fact that women already constituted one 
third of armed forces during the war. On the other hand, there is little effort to address 
the ethnic and religious divides on a local level. To evaluate the existing programs 
dealing with grassroots peacebuilding I will now proceed to analyze the program 
initiated by Search for Common Ground in Nepal.  
Peace Songs in Nepal – Search for Common Ground 
Program Peace Process Communication Campaign was carried out in Nepal 
in 2008 by Search for Common Ground – Nepal (SCG-N) and with the financial 
support from the Rockwool Foundation. The main goal was to raise mass awareness 
about the peace process through the creation and dissemination of national peace 
songs. The songs were performed during a live concert broadcast on Kantipur 
                                                
20  Annual Report 2014: UNDP in Nepal, United Nations Development Programme,[2014]). 
21  Ibid. 
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Television. The program also included a series of workshops to influence journalists 
and strengthen civil society relationships as well as creation of Radio Public Service 
Announcements (PSA). The process of song writing was filmed and a documentary 
entitled “Journey for Peace” was produced and disseminated.23  
First, I will present the results of a quantitative survey conducted following the 
implementation of the program. Annex 4.1.1 which can be found at the end of this 
chapter, contains the data analysis of the quantitative survey and was taken from the 
Final Evaluation Report of the Peace Process Communication Campaign. It is 
important to note, that the participants in the quantitative survey had access to all 
strategies including the peace songs, the series of workshops to influence journalists 
and strengthen civil society relationships as well as the PSAs. However, only 26% of 
the survey respondents admitted to have heard the peace songs and therefore their 
contribution to the survey outcome is limited. For that reason I focused on the peace 
songs and more specifically on the experience of the participants in the process of 
song creation, to see if it has the potential to strengthen the community and promote 
peaceful means of conflict resolution among the participants. Prior to analysing the 
quantitative and qualitative outcomes of the Peace Process Communication 
Campaign, I will explain why music could be a peacebuilding tool.   
Music is widely recognized as a powerful tool that allows people to 
communicate non-verbally. Thus, it could be understood as a universal language that 
enables people to unite through an external experience of sound. Music was used to 
heal veterans during WWII and since then, music therapy has become a field of study. 
Its potential as a peacebuilding tool has been a subject of analysis and a growing 
                                                
23  Basudev Neupane and Tajendra J. Pherali, Final Evaluation Report: Peace Process Communication 
Campaign (Search for Common Ground - Nepal,[2008]). 
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number of researchers show evidence of its effectiveness in the process of conflict 
transformation.24 
 Christopher Small points out that music is not only the observable sound 
effect, which we perceive with our senses but a process called “musicking.” This 
process involves the act of listening, performing, rehearsing, practicing, composing or 
dancing. Consequently, it relies on cooperation between the composer and the 
performers as well as the public. 
The act of musicking establishes in the place where it is happening a set of 
relationships, and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies. They are 
to be found not only between those organized sounds which are conventionally 
thought of as being the stuff of musical meaning but also between the people who are 
taking part, in whatever capacity, in the performance; and they model, or stand as 
metaphor for, ideal relationships as the participants in the performance imagine them 
to be: relationships between person and person, between individual and society, 
between humanity and the natural world and even perhaps the supernatural world.25  
 
It is also through relationships and through interaction with the Other that 
human beings develop empathy, which has been identified as one of a key elements of 
peace. Johan Galtung defined peace as “the capacity to transform conflicts with 
empathy, creativity and non-violence.”26 Music relies on cooperation between 
individuals who gather in order to achieve a common goal. As such it is a democratic 
participation in a process which involves emotional and non-verbal means of 
communication and is based on non-manipulative, cooperative relationships. In order 
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26 Quoted in  Baruch Whitehead, "We Shall Overcome: The Roles of Music in the US Civil Rights 
Movement," in Music and Conflict Transformation: Harmonies and Dissonances in Geopolitics, eds. 




to create music the participants need to engender personal harmony and personal 
knowing of the other, which fosters tolerance and acceptance.27 
 Perhaps establishing relationships could be, from the peacebuilders’ point of 
view, music’s most significant contribution to peacebuilding. However, throughout 
history songs that came out of these creative processes were often powerful tools 
which incited masses of people to continue their struggle for good or evil. Mary 
Travers, a civil rights activist who participated in the US Civil Rights Movement, said 
that “music has always been the accompaniment of social change.”28 Such 
interpretation opens avenues for further investigation into how music can be used in 
promoting peace in the post-war societies. I will now evaluate the quantitative data 
derived from the Final Evaluation Report of the Peace Process Communication 
Campaign. 
Peace Process Communication Campaign – quantitative and qualitative evidence 
The results of the quantitative survey contain responses from 400 participants 
who were exposed to either of the three communication strategies (peace songs, 
workshops and public service announcements). They represented four districts: 
Kathmandu, Morang, Kailali and Banke. 75 respondents were interviewed in the 
baseline study coming from the districts of Kailali, Rukum and Sankhuwasabha. The 
survey participants represented different age groups, professions and educational 
levels.  They were drawn from across section of civil society including journalists, 
political leaders and social workers. The survey verified to what degree the following 
five main objectives were understood: 1) local community constituencies know that 
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Research (London: I.B Tauris, 2008), p. 13-25. 
28 Quoted in Baruch  Baruch Whitehead, We Shall Overcome: The Roles of Music in the US Civil 
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peace is a process, 2) local community constituencies believe that they have a part to 
play in implementing the peace process at a local level, 3) local community 
constituencies implement programmes to take action in support of the peace process, 
4) local community constituencies bring people together from across the dividing line 
and 5) local community constituencies open a channel of communication that aims to 
hold leaders accountable.29  
The findings varied depending on age, profession and educational level (see 
detailed results in Annex 4.1.1). However, the survey revealed that on average 70% of 
people believed that peace in an on-going process, as against 40% in the baseline. 
Differences could be observed among districts with participants in Morang having a 
better understanding than those in Kailali. Additionally, 63% of the respondents 
understood that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2006 was a document, 
while 20% thought it was a cease-fire. The responses obtained to evaluate the second 
objective revealed that 44% of respondents believed that they had an important role to 
play in the local peacebuilding process, as against 40% in the baseline. The majority 
of those who thought they could contribute to peace concluded that they could do so 
by stopping the war. When asked who were the most influential actors in the peace 
process, 39% of the respondents identified the national political leaders, followed by 
civil society, youth and neighbouring countries. It was further recognized that leaders’ 
ability to design and implement policies was the reason why this option was the 
choice for the majority of the survey participants.30  
To assess whether there was a perception that local actors could take action 
towards peace the respondents were asked where the peace process taking place. 61% 
identified the province of Kathmandu, while 24% thought that peace process was only 
                                                
29  Basudev Neupane and Tajendra J. Pherali, Final Evaluation Report: Peace Process Communication 
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taking place in the newspapers. Roughly one third of the respondents expressed their 
interest in participating in peace initiatives. 24% would do so by raising voices 
through different means and 15% would organize a group.  
Only 15% of the respondents believed that peace promotion at all levels could 
bring people together across the dividing lines of gender, caste, economic status, 
social status, language, geographical locations, culture and political background. They 
also thought that it was easiest to bring people together from different gender and 
educational backgrounds. On the other hand, political ideology, economic status and 
religious background were identified as the most difficult barriers in uniting people.  
When it comes to individual initiatives to solve local problems, 39% found that 
organizing a common forum would be the most effective strategy. 21% thought that 
the media would allow them to raise issues and attract other actors to solve local 
disputes. When it comes to solving national problems, the media was seen as the most 
efficient tool by 55% of respondents. Similarly, 70% thought it was the most effective 
tool in holding the leaders accountable for their actions. Among media outputs which 
could best contribute to the peace process 21.4% of respondents indicated radio drama 
as the most helpful, followed by radio interaction programmes/talk shows (18.6%) 
and radio public service announcements (11.3%).  
It is worth noting that among various programmes aiming to promote peace 
implemented in Nepal (the choice included news, articles, drama, PSAs, UNMIN 
radio program), 11% of respondents indicated that peace songs/poems would be 
effective in raising popular awareness of the peace process. Interaction programmes 
and interviews were mentioned by 18%, peace accords and negotiations between 
political parties by 13%, and TV and radio drama by 12%. Peace songs were therefore 
judged as the fourth most efficient means to raise awareness about the peace process 
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in Nepal (for details see Annex 4.1.1). Among the survey participants an average of 
26% admitted to have heard one of the two peace songs broadcast on national TV and 
on various radio stations. The results varied across the districts with 36% of 
respondents having heard the songs in Morang, 34% in Kailali, 19% in Kathmandu 
and 14% in Banke (Figure 4.1). These differences might stem from the unequal 
distribution efforts among the districts or could be an indication that the compositions 
resonated better with certain groups based on their melodies or instruments used 
during the performance. The survey also revealed that the songs were more popular 
among the younger generation of Nepalese, specifically 67% of respondents who 
heard the songs were between the age of 24 to 45, and 28% between the age of 18 and 
24.31  
Although there were differences in how many people have heard the songs among 
districts, this fact does not seem to influence the overall findings of the report when 
questions unrelated to peace songs are asked. For example, in two districts where over 
30% of the respondents admitted being familiar with the songs, Kailali and Morang, 
the results varied considerably when it comes to understanding that peace is a process 
as opposed to an event. In Kailiali on average 57% of political leaders saw peace as a 
process while in Morang 100% had the same view. Consequently, the peace songs did 
not seem to have any impact on how people understood the peace process at the time 
when the survey was conducted. It would be helpful to analyse whether similar 
conclusions on the district level could be observed in regard to other questions asked 
during the survey. Unfortunately, the data is not available. 
                                                




Figure 4.1. Awareness of the peace songs. From: Basudev	  Neupane	  and	  Tajendra	  J.	  Pherali,	  Final	  
Evaluation	  Report:	  Peace	  Process	  Communication	  Campaign	  (Search	  for	  Common	  Ground	  -­‐	  
Nepal,[2008])	  
 
 Finally, the report indicated that 23% of survey participants had listened to the 
Sunau, Bolou (Let’s Listen, Let’s Speak) radio program. Among those who listened, 
18% admitted that they had learned how to take the peace process forward and that 
their awareness of the peace process had increased. 27% of the respondents listened to 
the Naya Bato, Naya Paila (New Path, New Footsteps) radio program. 24% of 
listeners thought that the program was promoting peace while 16% admitted that it 
had raised their awareness about human rights and women’s rights.  Although the 
peace songs were part of radio programming it is not clear to what extent they have 
contributed to the above results.  
I will now focus on the qualitative data, specifically the interviews with the 
participants of the peace song retreats, where people from various backgrounds were 
brought together to write the lyrics and compose the melodies. It is important to note, 
that in order to assess the effectiveness of the national peace songs in a long run there 
should be an effort to play them regularly for an extended period of time so that the 
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messages of peace and positive transformation can be disseminated and internalized 
by the general public.  
According to the report, one of the most successful outcomes of the Peace 
Process Communication Campaign was the creation of two national peace songs: 
“Beautiful and Peaceful Our Country Nepal” and “In Your Eyes I See My Mother’s 
Smile.” The songs were presented in a musical show that was telecast by Kantipur TV 
and broadcast on 16 FM radio stations. Later on they were further distributed to 129 
FM stations nationwide. The process of the songs’ creation took place in two stages 
and brought together leaders of political organizations, musicians, poets and peace 
builders. They represented different social, political and cultural groups such as 
Madheshi (ethnic group based in the flatlands), Maoists, ex-Nepal Army personnel, 
Tharu (ethnic group based in Western Terai), Dalit (lower caste) and others. This 
representation was captured through the use of various ethnic instruments, which 
originated from different regions of the country. They incorporated musical traditions 
from diverse regions of Nepal and were also found to respect different cultural 
practices. The songs were expected to promote the messages of unity, tolerance and 
reconciliation.32  
The first stage, a peace song retreat, was organized on the bank of Trisuli 
River where for three days the participants were involved in various activities that 
aimed at team building, facilitating dialogue and discussion to foster a better 
understanding. Trust building exercises included soccer and other outdoor activities to 
bring people together and interact in a peaceful environment. Aggressive debates held 
in the beginning were followed by stories of shared experiences of violence and grief. 
                                                
32  Ibid. 
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The documentary captured the process and served as an additional tool in promoting 
the positive transformation among the Nepalis. 
A Madheshi participant and a Tharu participant in the peace song retreat engage in a 
hot debate on their regional agendas at the beginning of the documentary whereas 
their aggressive debate and disturbing facial expressions disappear when the retreat 
process progresses towards the end. They initially argue on words ‘Terai’ and 
‘Madhesh’ but later they agree on the word ‘Terai.’ The film captures the gradual 
improvement in relationships between these two participants culminating in a true 
example of friendship.33 
 
On the last day, the participants were divided into three groups and each group 
was involved in the process of writing a peace song. The groups would then offer 
each other feedback based on what they heard. The second stage, a musical retreat, 
took place in a Hattiban Resort in the hilly area near Kathmandu. For two more days 
the songs were arranged and perfected in terms of their musical content.34  
This unique opportunity of musical retreats could potentially offer people a 
new perspective on their lives and how they can contribute to the peacebuilding effort 
in Nepal. The message of unity and harmony among the Nepalese dominated the 
lyrics: “the Terai is carrying the mountains on its shoulders, if we share love, it will 
spread like love, we are the colorful flowers, we are called Nepali” or ”beautiful, 
peaceful our country Nepal, the huge oceans are but drops of dew, Maruni (Hilly 
dance), Jhijhiya (Maithali dance from Madhesh), Selo (Himalayan dance), Tappa 
(Magar dance from the highlands), let’s dance singing peace songs.” By expressing 
their thoughts, feelings and experiences the participants were able to write the songs 
that could appeal to various castes, and ethnic and religious groups.35 
Based on interviews, most participants “went through a process of dramatic 
attitudinal change in term of dealing with differences in their lives both at personal 
                                                
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
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and professional levels.” Because some of the contributors were active figures in the 
society, the impact of their positive transformation could have an effect on the 
communities they were involved with. For example, one of the participants gave up a 
post of General Secretary of the Madheshi Janaadhikar Forum (forum for the rights of 
Madheshi people) and began working with SCG – Nepal. 
In the beginning I was totally against the people from other ethnic groups such as 
Tharus. But as I started participating in different outdoors activities, discussions and 
dialogues, I realized that I should respect the coexistence, harmony and unity which 
are the most essential factors for the development of any country. […] My own 
Madheshi friends from my student life could be the main obstacle in my new path as 
we fought violently against the Pahadi together. But I am sure with what I have 
learned from the retreat I will be able to transform not only my friends but many 
others. 36  
 
The report further indicated that one participant would probably join the agitating 
armed groups had he not changed his mind during the retreat. Similarly, there were 
testimonies by people involved in the documenting process who observed a genuine 
transformation among the people.  
As a general participant of the peace song retreat, I found the programme to be truly 
inclusive; an honestly carried out effort in which people shared their experiences 
emotionally with tears in their eyes and in which people dreamt of their effort to be 
substantially useful in the peace process of Nepal.37  
 
The diverse instruments introduced during the process of music creation had a 
positive effect on the participants. One musician mentioned he was not aware that 
instruments from Terai were also played in Nepali music. Another participant 
changed his attitude towards Nepali songs after the retreat. 
We studied the participants during the first half of the retreat – a participant said he 
would not listen to Nepali songs at all! As the process moved ahead the relationship 
among the participants grew intimate, helping to break down the stereotype. We 
learnt why he would not listen to Nepali music and we came to understand the 
reasons behind his feelings. He opened up his feelings and cooperated with us. We 
did the same.38 
                                                
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 




Although generally people were very satisfied with the retreat, some expressed the 
view that they would prefer to engage in in-depth dialogues rather than having to 
participate in mandatory outdoor activities. Additionally, voices were raised among 
the musicians who observed that although the lyrics were written collectively, only 
one name would be later highlighted in the program. The same would be true for the 
music composing process where only one band would get credit despite the fact that 
the music was composed collectively. 
In sum, the Peace Process Communication Campaign and specifically the 
creation of the peace songs have shown mixed results. Because only the average of 
26% of the respondents have heard the songs, it is also difficult to assess to which 
extent the results of the quantitative survey were influenced by the dissemination of 
the peace songs. Additionally, the comparison of data on the district level revealed 
that the familiarity of the participants with the peace songs had no influence on how 
they understood the peace process. Other available data, specifically regarding the 
radio programs is too broad to provide meaningful assessment of the peace songs 
effectiveness in raising awareness about peace.  
However, the efforts on a local level, specifically the process of bringing 
people together to write lyrics and compose music was quite effective in providing a 
setting for behavioural transformation. The emotional opening and sharing of 
traumatic experiences helped the participants to find their common humanity in the 
conflict which divided them along ethnic, political and social lines. Transforming 
these painful memories to create a song for peace had a powerful effect on the 
contributors who were able to better understand that peace was a process and that 
their participation in that process was necessary. Although it was difficult to judge the 
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long-term effects of the peace songs, the general perception was that they had the 
potential “of becoming powerful messengers of peace in Nepal.”39 That was mainly 
because the music was inclusive of most cultures and appealed to the general public 




                                                






































































   
 
Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 This study has examined whether strategic arts-based programs with local 
content can potentially contribute to more lasting peace by raising awareness about 
peaceful solutions to everyday problems affecting post-conflict societies and therefore 
strengthening the community. To some degree all three programs implemented by 
SCG succeeded in initiating discussions about peaceful resorts to daily disputes and in 
many cases participants went through a positive behavioural transformation. 
However, in the case of Yemen and Nepal, there were indications that the programs 
had limited results in achieving their goals, especially on a national as compared to 
local level.  
 The Team in Yemen was the least promising of all three programs and it offers 
a few interesting insights on strategic arts-based programs and the conditions under 
which they are most effective. Although the findings of the final evaluation report 
showed that the program had little impact on changing the attitudes of the survey 
participants, the results varied across the governorates. Additionally, the report 
revealed that efforts at disseminating the art project, that is the episodic drama, on a 
local level when combined with discussions, had a much greater impact on the 
participants. This attests again to the fact that local input has a better chance of 
achieving the desired outcomes than similar efforts on a national level.  
Another reason why the program was not able to perform at its best capacity 
might have been the timing of its implementation. Year 2011, when it was launched, 
was marked by a violent uprising: the Arab Spring. As mentioned before, in order for 
strategic arts programs to be successful the right strategy has to be implemented at the 
right time. Although it was difficult to predict the emergence of Arab Spring 
uprisings, they could have potentially undermined the program’s overall performance.  
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 Similarly, in Nepal, the Peace Process Communication Campaign program 
seems to have had the biggest impact on the participants of the peace song and 
musical retreats judging by the qualitative assessments as opposed to its effect on the 
larger population of Nepal which was small, based on the quantitative survey. In the 
case of Nepal it was clear that music served as a tool or a focal point which brought 
together very diverse groups of people who normally would not have interacted with 
each other in a peaceful environment. The musical processes combined with trust 
building exercises created an atmosphere of confidence and reconciliation, where 
people opened up to speak about their traumatic experiences and connected 
emotionally. The testimonies indicated that strong bonds were established between 
participants who previously fought with each other. Additionally, there was a better 
understanding among contributors of what the peace process was and how they could 
contribute to it by resorting to non-violent means of resolving daily disputes.  
 The program Strengthening repatriation and reintegration through 
information and conflict transformation implemented in DRC was the most 
successful in achieving desired goals, namely strengthening the conflict resolution 
capacities of local actors. It could serve as an example of a strategic arts based 
program, which was implemented at the right time, using appropriate strategies and 
addressing the most urgent issues of the population at hand.  
Participatory theater was accessible to all people and there was no need to 
have electricity or a TV set in order to participate. In DRC, where access to such basic 
needs is limited, this strategy was crucial. Additionally, the interviews conducted with 
villagers before the performances provided the best possible content for the theater 
piece and the discussion. Through the interviews the actors identified the sources of 
disputes among the community members, therefore using the arts to address the issues 
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which were the most important at a given moment. They used the right techniques at 
the right time, for example, by playing out scenes of land conflicts in regions and at a 
time when the refugees would come back to their properties. The testimonies and 
results of quantitative surveys show the increased levels of awareness about peaceful 
methods of conflict resolution such as dialogue and mediation.  
 In all three cases, there was an effort to use art as an external platform and a 
creative space for people where they could see their problems from an outside 
perspective. Through its universal appeal, disconnected from any political or ethnic 
affiliation, art became a safe space where people of all diverse backgrounds could 
meet, participate in the creative act and then through discussions find common 
ground. 
The testimonies of the participants proved that these processes were 
instrumental in initiating a behavioural change. This might seem insignificant taking 
into consideration the limited scope of these programs and the relatively small number 
of participants. Nevertheless, their potential for spreading norms of non-violent means 
of conflict resolution is remarkable. This is because, unlike other programs aiming at 
poverty alleviation or economic empowerment, these programs promote new ways of 
thinking and interacting with the Other, whether he or she represents a different caste, 
ethnic group or political party. The issues which lie at the core of the conflicts in most 
developing countries cannot be resolved any time soon. Poverty, economic inequality, 
access to resources, land conflicts and other issues worth fighting for will remain the 
characteristics of these societies for many years to come. Although addressing these 
problems is equally important, arts-based programs with local content could help 
foster a more peaceful environment where financial aid and economic empowerment 
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